Tuesday, September 20, 2011

B188–release from detention reasonable in all the circumstances, onus on Minister

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. B188, 2011 FC 94 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Heneghan

Date heard: December 16, 2010

Date decided: January 26, 2011

Counsel for B188: Gabriel Chand

Counsel for Minister: Banafsheh Sokhansanj

Place of Hearing: Vancouver, British Columbia

The Minister applied for judicial review of the decision of Member Marc Tessler releasing the Respondent (B188) from detention (para. 1).

Justice Mosley stayed the release at in November 2010 (para. 2).

The respondent C188 was a Sri Lankan man who had worked for a newspaper in an LTTE-controlled area of north Sri Lanka, and about whom Canada Border Services Agency had alleged he was an LTTE member (paras. 3-8). He had arrived in Canada on the MV Sun Sea, and made a refugee claim. Upon arrival he had a debt of several thousand dollars for the passage, and he stated that his brother, a resident of France, could assist him in paying the debt (para. 9).

At about his fifth detention review, Member Tessler rejected the Minister’s argument that B188 was a flight risk and that the debt increased the risk that he would be “vulnerable for coercion from the smuggler”, and that the allegations of LTTE membership was not straightforward (para. 13). The Member found that terms and condition could be opposed which would mitigate the risk (para. 14).

The Applicant Minister submitted that the Member focused on whether the Applicant could defend the charge of LTTE membership, and not on whether he would appear for removal (paras. 27-28).

Following Justice de Montigny’s decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. B157, 2010 FC 1314, Justice Heneghan cited the following:

“[45]           There were good reasons for the Member to focus on the next immigration proceeding rather than the removal.  An officer may always, with or without a warrant, re-arrest the Respondent if he has reasonable grounds to believe he is inadmissible (an easily-met condition if the Respondent were found inadmissible by the Immigration Division) and is unlikely to appear for his removal: s. 54 of IRPA.

…

[47]           In light of these further proceedings that are set to occur before removal and of the possibility of re-arresting the Respondent, the Member’s failure to conduct a premature analysis of the likelihood to appear for removal, as compared to the probability of appearing for the inadmissibility hearing, does not represent a fatal flaw in his decision.” (para. 32)

Justice Heneghan further found that the Member did make a proper assessment of flight risk (paras. 34-36).

Furthermore, Justice Heneghan found that the Board properly assessed the factor of the debt, given that the onus is on the Minister to show that the Respondent is a flight risk and given the evidence on the record (paras. 37-43).

Finally, Justice Heneghan found that the terms and conditions were reasonable, noting in particular that the Member imposed all the terms and conditions requested by the Minister at the Detention Review, “except for two, which the Board determined to be either irrelevant or redundant, but refused to impose a cash bond.” (paras. 46-50).

MINISTER’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW REFUSED

Ortiz Torres–misconstrued evidence leading to faulty credibility analysis

Ortiz Torres v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 67

Judge: Justice Shore

Date heard: January 17, 2011

Date decided: January 26, 2011

Counsel for Ortiz Torres: Adela Crossley

Counsel for Minister: Kareena R. Wilding

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicants were a family from Mexico, who claimed on the basis that they were in fear of the Los Zetas gang, which had influence with every level of police in every region of Mexico (paras. 1-5).

Justice Shore pointed out a number of errors. The RPD wrongly relied on a translation of documents that said the principal Applicant was a “Police Service Technician” or a “non-commissioned officer” in finding that he was not credible when he testified that he was a police officer (paras. 6-8). The Board ignored relevant evidence and misconstrued the evidence before it (paras. 20-21). The Board refused to consider the fact that documents en route to the Applicant had been seized by Canadian customs, despite the Applicant proffering evidence (paras. 22-24). Because of its errors, the Board’s negative credibility assessment was flawed. It therefore also erred in its general analysis of risk and IFA (paras. 32-33).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Tuesday, August 02, 2011

Cruz Pineda—gang violence as particularized risk

Cruz Pineda v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 81 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Kelen

Date heard: January 12, 2010

Date decided: January 24, 2011

Counsel for Cruz Pineda: Patrick J. Roche

Counsel for Minister: Jane Stewart

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant requested judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying the Applicant’s claim for refugee status on the basis of his fear of a gang in his native Honduras (para. 2).

The Applicant worked as a delivery and cash pick-up person for a large grocery chain in Tula, Honduras (para. 3). In January 2006, he and his assistant were attacked by proclaimed members of the Mara Salvatrucha (“MS-13”) gang; the Applicant was beaten and warned off from telling the police, although he did tell his employers (para. 5).

The Applicant quit his job and began working for another company. In June 2007, the Applicant was again attacked on the road by the same men from MS-13; after injuring the Applicant they told him they would spare his life only if he told them about the best trucks to rob (paras. 5-6). The Applicant agreed but instead quit his job and moved, eventually fleeing to Canada (paras. 7-9).

The RPD found that what the applicant feared had no nexus to the Convention as he was a victim of crime (paras. 12-16).

The RPD made comments that the Applicant had been targeted, namely “‘the claimant became personally subjected to the risk of the MS’” (para. 17). However, the RPD then found that the applicant faced generalized, as opposed to personalized risk (para. 19). The RPD also found that the Applicant had an Internal Flight alternative (IFA) (paras. 21-23).

The Court found that the RPD had erred in finding that the Applicant was subject to only a generalized risk, in part because of an expert opinion letter noting that people who are perceived as having crossed or slighted MS-13 were at particular risk (paras. 37-39).

In the same vein, the RPD’s finding of an IFA was unreasonable since the RPD itself recognized that MS-13 operated throughout Honduras, and the same expert evidence was clear that the Applicant would be especially targeted (paras. 40-44).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Wisdom—insufficient weight to psychiatric assessment

Judge: Justice Beaudry

Date heard: January 18, 2010

Date decided: January 21, 2011

Counsel for Wisdom: Debbie Mankovitz and Simon Gruda

Counsel for Minister: Sébastien Dasylva

Place of Hearing: Montréal, Quebec

This was a review of the refusal of the Applicant’s application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (para. 1). The Applicant asserted that he was a national of Sierra Leone, although that was not determined (para. 3).

The Applicant was approximately 17 years old when he came to Canada, having spent time in Nigeria, Gabon, the Netherlands, and Brazil. In the latter two countries, he made refugee claims which were refused (para. 4). His Canadian refugee claim was refused in August 2006, in part because the RPD found him excluded under Article 1F(a) and 1F(c) because of a tattoo which allegedly identified him as a member of a rebel group “responsible for serious crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone” (para. 5).

Six months after the refusal (in early 2007), the Applicant was hospitalized for psychiatric reasons for five months (para. 6).

In judging the H&C application, the officer found that the applicant had not made sufficient efforts to integrate, and gave weight to the RPD’s finding that the applicant’s identity was not establish (paras. 8-9). Reference letters and the reports of a social worker and psychiatrist were given little weight (paras. 10-11).

The Court found that the officer put too much weight on the question of whether the Applicant’s identity was objectively determined, and therefore put too little weight on the medical/psychiatric evidence (paras. 13-14).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Anthonipillai—unreasonable credibility assessment

Anthonipillai v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 66 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Shore

Date heard: January 18, 2010

Date decided: January 21, 2011

Counsel for Anthonipillai: Krassina Kostadinov

Counsel for Minister: Lorne McClenaghan

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

In this extremely brief decision, Justice Shore notes that “The Applicant has countered every single finding the RPD made in its brief reasons on the Applicant’s credibility in a manner that casts serious doubt on the essence and substantiation of the findings” (para. 7). Furthermore, “In this matter, the RPD did make core findings that were unsubstantiated by the evidence before it …” (para. 9).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Monday, August 01, 2011

MPSEP v. Nosa—detention review, JR moot

Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Nosa, 2011 FC 76 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Martineau

Date heard: October 6, 2010

Date decided: January 21, 2011

Counsel for Nosa: Idorenyin E. Amana, Esq.

Counsel for Minister: Helen Gray

Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario

The Minister applied for a judicial review of a Member of the Immigration Division’s (ID) decision to release Nosa from detention (para. 1). The Court declined to decide the decision on its merits, finding it was moot (para. 23).

Nosa arrived in Canada with another person’s passport (Mavis Idemudia), but when asked gave the name of Noah Sho-Silva, although he had no documents to confirm this identity (para. 2). He stated that he had used his genuine documents to enter the US, and had purchased false documents and entered Canada on those (para. 3). Evidence on his person did not match the refugee claim he made (para. 4).

Since Nosa’s identity was not confirmed, he was detained. This detention was upheld at a 48-hour review, and again at a 7-day review (paras. 5-7). His detention continued to be upheld on the basis that the CBSA was making reasonable efforts to confirm his identity while he was not being fully cooperative (paras. 8-10). Then in an April decision, the ID found that Nosa had recently been cooperative, whereas the CBSA had not continued making reasonable efforts. Therefore, the ID released Nosa on the basis of reporting conditions and a $3000 bond (para. 11-12).

The procedural issues raised by the Respondent were rejected by the Court (paras. 15-21).

The Court found the issue moot (para. 23). The Court noted that Nosa had been released 9 months previously, and that the Minister had not sought to stay the release (para. 26).

The evidence submitted by the Minister was about the alleged errors in the ID decision. However, the Court notes that given the language of IRPA, the issue is one of present concern with the detained person’s identity. The Minister submitted only evidence which was 9 months old (paras. 28-29). The Court further notes that there was no evidence of a continuing adversarial context, nor that judicial economy militated in favor of hearing the application (para. 33). 

MINISTER’S JUDICIAL REVIEW DISMISSED

Gomes Sousa—failure to assess gender issues in state protection

Gomes Sousa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 63 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Noël

Date heard: January 17, 2011

Date decided: January 20, 2011

Counsel for Gomes Sousa: Laura Setzer

Counsel for Minister: Helene Robertson

Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario

The applicant and her son (the minor applicant) were nationals of Brazil. They fled the abuse of the applicant’s former spouse, Marcus, who had substance abuse and other psychiatric issues. The applicant had complained to the police but was told there was little they could do (paras. 1-2). The applicant initially had some support from her parents-in-law, but they blocked the involvement of the police because the father-in-law was himself involved in criminal activity, and he subsequently threatened the applicant (para. 3).

The Court determined that main issue was sufficiently of state protection and the application of the Gender Guidelines (para. 5).

The Court relied on Dean v Canada(Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 772 for the proposition that while a subjective unwillingness to go to the authorities was not, itself, sufficient to rebut state protection, circumstances may be such that they do not. The judge noted that in this case: “proper consideration of the Gender Guidelines may have led to a finding that this reticence to engage the proper authorities was more than subjective” (para. 7). The Court notes that the RPD failed to consider the Gender Guidelines when analyzing the applicant’s failure to approach the police (para. 8).

The RPD found that the applicant’s narrative about the father-in-law was implausible; the judge noted that “implausibility findings must only be made in the clearest of cases” (citing Valtchev v Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 776) (paras. 9-10). The decision concluded:

Hence, the Board’s decision in regards to the sufficiency of state protection is flawed in two aspects. Firstly, it failed to adequately assess the Gender Guidelines in order to fully address the reasons for which state protection was not sought, and secondly, it made an unreasonable plausibility finding, thus depriving the Applicants of a full and proper assessment of the reasons for which state protection was not sought. As such, the decision falls outside the range of acceptable outcomes defensible in fact and in law. The proper remedy is to send the matter for redetermination before a newly constituted panel of the Board. (para. 11)

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Umubyeyi—interpretation errors

Umubyeyi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 69 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Noël

Date heard: January 17, 2011

Date decided: January 19, 2011

Counsel for Umubyeyi: Isaac Owusu-Sechere

Counsel for Minister: Korinda McLaine

Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario

The applicant is a Rwandan national whose refugee claim was denied on the basis that her testimony was vague, and the applicant alleged on the basis on improper translation (para. 1-2).

The decision notes that the procedural fairness issues of interpretation are to be reviewed on a correctness standard (para. 4). The Court did not review the recording of the hearing and does not speak the language of interpretation, therefore it relied on an affidavit which attested that “there were indeed discrepancies in the translation” (para. 5). The Court noted that the right to interpretation is grounded in s. 14 of the Charter, which is supported by the case law, and gives an applicant a right  to translation “the is “continuous, precise, competent, impartial and contemporaneous” (paras. 6-7).

The judge noted that applicant ought to raise the issue of interpretation at the RPD hearing (para. 7). However, this may not be possible where the language barriers are such that no one can appreciate errors are being made (para. 8).

The judge also noted that there is some division in the jurisprudence on how error-free the interpretation must be to attract reversal by the Court(para. 9). However, “the affidavit evidence is sufficient to establish a concern of the adequacy of the translation at the Board hearing” (para. 10). Specifically, there were translation errors that led the RPD to make a negative credibility finding (para. 11).

As there was nothing to suggest that the RPD Member made any errors (since the interpretation errors were not known during the hearing), the case was sent back to be reheard by the same Member.

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Aguilar Zacarias—gang targeting as particularized risk

Aguilar Zacarias v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 62 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Noël

Date heard: January 17, 2011

Date decided: January 19, 2011

Counsel for Aguilar Zacarias: Laïla Demirdache

Counsel for Minister: Korinda McLaine

Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario

The applicant was a Guatemalan national who claimed persecution at the hands of the Maras Salvatruchas (MS) gang, and one member of that gang in particular (para. 3). The applicant was a vendor in a market where he and other vendors were being extorted; he and another vendor informed on the gang, leading to one member being arrested but later released (para. 5). Eventually, the other informer was shot in an incident where the applicant was present (para. 6).

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found the applicant’s story credible (para. 8) and further found that the applicant’s delay in making a claim while he had a valid temporary workers permit was reasonable on the precedent of Gyawali v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2003 FC 1099 (para. 9). However, the RPD found that the applicant did not have a nexus to a Convention ground (para. 10).

At the Federal Court, the Minister submitted that the risk faced by the applicant was generalized, as criminal and the MS are particularly rampant in Guatemala (para. 12). The applicant argued that he was specifically targeted because of his actions against the gang and his knowledge of the murder his co-informant (para. 13).

Justice Noël relied upon the case of Martinez Pineda v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 365, wherein the applicant was targeted by the same gang in El Salvador (paras. 16-17). He noted that:

As was the case in Martinez Pineda, the Board erred in its decision: it focused on the generalized threat suffered by the population of Guatemala while failing to consider the Applicant’s particular situation. Because the Applicant’s credibility was not in question, the Board had the duty to fully analyse and appreciate the personalized risk faced by the Applicant in order to render a complete analysis of the Applicant’s claim for asylum under section 97 of the IRPA. It appears that the Applicant was not targeted in the same manner as any other vendor in the market: reprisal was sought because he had collaborated with authorities, refused to comply with the gang’s requests and knew of the circumstance of Mr. Vicente’s death. (para. 17)

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Liang—claim supported by documentary evidence, unreliable evidence from agent of persecution

Liang v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 65 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Shore

Date heard: January 19, 2011

Date decided: January 19, 2011

Counsel for Kumar: Hart A. Kaminker

Counsel for Minister: Alex C. Kam

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The applicant was a Chinese national who made a refugee claim on the basis of her belonging to an underground church (para. 8).

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) had found that, on a balance of probabilities, the authorities were not looking for the applicant “because no warrant/summons had been left at her home.” (para. 11)

However, Justice Shore found that the documentary evidence supported the applicant’s claim that the authorities could be looking for her, notwithstanding the lack of a summons/warrant left at her home (paras. 12-14). The RPD’s conclusion was therefore unreasonable.

The RPD also found that “the evidence did not support that the Applicant has good grounds for fearing persecution in an unregistered house church” (para. 15). Justice Shore noted that, notwithstanding the lack of documentary evidence of house-church members being arrested in Fujian province, there was documentary evidence of other kinds of persecution and destruction of house-churches (paras. 16-17). In particular, Justice Shore was critical of the RPD’s reliance upon evidence produced by the Chinese government (i.e., the agent of persecution) (para. 20). Therefore, since the documentary evidence supported the claim, it was unreasonable for the RPD to deny it (para. 22).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Josile—women as a particular social group

Josile v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 39 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Martineau

Date heard: December 8, 2010

Date decided: January 17, 2011

Counsel for Josile: Russell L. Kaplan

Counsel for Minister: Helene Robertson

Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario

The applicant was a female Haitian national who had left Haiti in 2005 and had a refugee claim rejected in the United States, following which she came to Canada and in 2007 made a claim on the basis of political opinion, social group Haitian women, and social group family (para. 3). Her father was a minor local official who had been beaten and threatened for cooperating with the police, and she also feared the level of sexual assault and lack of state protection for women (para. 4).

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found that the applicant was not credible regarding her family’s situation (para. 5). Regarding the other grounds, the RPD found that she feared criminals, not politically-motivated harm, and therefore was not protected by the Convention (para. 6). Finally, the RPD found that Haitian women do not face persecution as a particular social group, as any persecution they faced was, again, criminal rather than political (para. 7). She challenged the RPD’s legal analysis of criminality versus political persecution.

Justice Martineau noted that:

The situation of sexual abuse and violence against women in Haiti has recently come to the attention of the Federal Court … In this regard, the Court has cautioned the Board not to import into the definition of a Convention refugee, legal requirements which are specific to section 97 when the Board is assessing whether the fear of persecution is based on a Convention ground in light of section 96 of the Act. (para. 11)

Having reviewed the case law, Justice Martineau noted:

Indeed, a gender-specific claim cannot be rejected simply because the group in question or its members face general oppression and the claimant’s fear of persecution is not supported by an individualized set of facts. Where the claimant has not, himself or herself, experienced the type of persecution, he or she fears, the claimant can use evidence of similarly-situated persons to demonstrate the risk and the unwillingness or inability of the state to protect … (para. 22)

Justice Martineau then turned to similar immigration cases (Dezameau v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 559 (CanLII)) as well as non-immigration jurisprudence (R. v. Osolin, 1993 CanLII 54 (S.C.C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595) as well as the Immigration and Refugee Board’s own Gender Guidelines, all as authority for the proposition that rape and sexual assault, by their very nature, target women as women (paras. 24-27). Therefore, according to those and other authorities, women fearing sexual assault are a particular social group (paras. 28-32). Therefore the RPD’s finding that nexus had not been established was unreasonable (para. 33).

Justice Martineau also criticized the RPD for making comments about the fact that boys can also be victims of rape (irrelevant, since in that circumstance they are a particular social group in themselves) (para. 34); and stated that “The Court is also appalled by certain gratuitous statements of the Board” about the crime of rape (para. 35).

Unusually, Justice Martineau went further than simply overturning the decision by directing the RPD to consider the new circumstances and risks arising out of events in Haiti since the initial claim was heard (paras. 38-39).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Kumar—failure to assess credibility

Kumar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 45 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Bédard

Date heard: January 11, 2011

Date decided: January 17, 2011

Counsel for Kumar: Michel Le Brun

Counsel for Minister: Isabelle Brochu

Place of Hearing: Montreal, Ontario

The applicant was an Indian national of the Hindu religion from the Punjab region who alleged persecution on the basis of his having been suspected of aiding two friends who were Sikh militants (para. 3).

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejected the claim on the basis that the applicant had an internal flight alternative (IFA) to Bombay. The RPD had not assessed the applicant’s credibility because, having found that there was an IFA, the RPD stated it was not necessary (para. 4).

Justice Bédard noted that the standard of review in assessing IFA was reasonableness (para. 6). She found that the RPD committed errors and that its decision out to be overturned (para. 10).

The RPD could not have assessed the issue of IFA without accepting certain parts of the applicant’s story as true. This is simply because the RPD cannot assess an IFA without regard to the circumstances, which it can only do with with reference to the claim (paras. 13-16). The RPD could not have accepted only the part of the claim which supported the finding of the IFA without some reason (para. 16).

However, that selective acceptance is exactly what the RPD did. It explicitly stated that it made its finding that there was an IFA “even if the claimant’s story had been true” (para. 17). However, it rejected other parts of the applicant’s story that militated against the finding of an IFA, i.e. his argument that the police would be looking for him throughout the country (paras. 18-21). The RPD could not accept certain parts of the claim and reject others without explicitly stating why it did so (para. 21).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Thursday, July 28, 2011

Sökmen–misapprehending medical evidence and failing to consider ability and willingness to pay for treatment

Sökmen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 47 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Martineau

Date heard: December 6, 2010

Date decided: January 17, 2011

Counsel for Sökmen: Nicole Goulet

Counsel for Minister: Agnieszka Zagorska

Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario

The Applicant was a Turkish national whose family’s application for permanent residence had been rejected by the visa officer in Ankara under sections 38(1)(c) and 42 of IRPA (para. 1). The VO had decided that the Applicant’s son, Bariş, had a health condition that would reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand (para. 2).

Bariş has a congenital heart disease, for which he has been treated in France (para. 6). The family plans to have him continued to be treated by his physician there, and they have the funds to support this course of treatment. His condition is currently stable and controlled by inexpensive and common medication (paras. 7-8).

Why then did the medical officer recommend, and the VO find, that excessive demand was an issue? The initial immigration medical in Turkey placed the son in category B, to wit: “Findings that require periodic specialist following care but which normally can be handled without resorting to repeated hospitalizations or the provision of social services” (paras. 11-12). That report was forwarded to the Paris Embassy, where a medical officer requested reports from the French specialist; these reports noted that the boy’s condition was controlled, and that some surgical or other medical intervention might be necessary in the future, but not the next five years (paras. 13-17).

In making his assessment, the medical officer Dr. Hindle exaggerated the boy’s condition and the expected future requirements (para. 18-19). This was compounded by the VO’s further errors, for instance in believing that Bariş would require excessive intervention within the next five to ten years (para. 19-20).

The regulations specifically refer to excessive demand as occurring within the first five years, unless there is evidence that they will occur later, in which case the maximum period is 10 years (para. 21).

Justice Martineau was critical of Dr. Hindle’s report as well, noting that it failed to deal with the Applicant’s proposed plan to arrange and fund their son’s care privately; he further concluded that “Dr. Hindle’s analysis is biased and incomplete. Dr. Hindle goes so far as to state that the prognosis is negative and that Bariş’ condition will deteriorate, which directly contradicts the medical evidence in the record.” (paras. 24-25) Dr. Hindle’s report is flawed in that it introduces future problems not raised by the expert physician most familiar with the boy’s case, and outright contradicts that physician’s reports while claiming to be based on them (paras. 25-29). It was open to the medical officer to disagree with the specialist, but only by doing so explicitly and with stated reasons (para. 29).

Even aside from the impugned medical report, the VO’s decision “is not supported by the evidence in the record and is speculative” (para. 33). There is no analysis of the Applicant’s proposal to alleviate an “excessive demand” his son’s condition might cause; the existence of such a proposal is not determinative but it must be considered (paras. 34-37).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Borisovna Abbasova–applicability of Gender Guidelines and failure to consider psychological issues in credibility

Borisovna Abbasova v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 43 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Shore

Date heard: January 10, 2011

Date decided: January 14, 2011

Counsel for Borisovna Abbasova: Denise Feret

Counsel for Minister: Christine Bernard

Place of Hearing: Montréal, Quebec

This was judicial review of a pre-removal risk assessment decision turning on the Gender Guidelines.

Justice Shore opened the reasons with the following emphatic but convoluted statement: “For decision-makers at all levels, procedural fairness sounds a rarely heard alarm, and that alarm must be heard if injustice is not to be done.” (para. 1)

The Applicant was a Russian national who alleged persecution at the hands of her common-law partner, in the form of domestic abuse complicated by the fact that the abuser was a police officer. She further alleged having been mislead by a fraudulent non-lawyer (para. 10).

Her refugee claim was denied in February 2009 (para. 12).

The Applicant filed a PRRA in August 2009, and it was denied in April 2010 (para. 13). A stay of removal was granted in June 2010 (para. 14).

The PRRA officer assigned no weight to the Applicant’s new evidence (para. 15).

The issues were whether the officer erred in not considering the relevant evidence and/or erred in failing to apply the Refugee Protection Division’s Guideline 7 of women fearing gender-related persecution (para. 16).

Justice Shore approved of the PRRA officer’s giving no weight to documentation which, while it post-dated the hearing, “simply echoed the information previously submitted” (paras. 28-30).

However, the PRRA officer also gave no weight to a post-hearing psychological assessment of the Applicant (para. 30). Justice Shore noted that the RPD had found the Applicant not credible, but the psychological report clarified this issue; the PRRA officer ought to have taken into consideration “Possible evidence of the applicant’s inability to testify” (paras. 30-31).

Justice Shore noted that:

It is not for the Court to reassess the evidence submitted to the PRRA officer and that is not what it intends to do; nonetheless, the developments in Ms. Abbasova’s evidence, particularly regarding her psychological condition, could have been considered to be relevant if they had been analyzed. More specifically, in her particular case, as shown, a psychological problem apparently impaired Ms. Abbasova’s ability to testify. That evidence could have been central to the determination of credibility, considering that the RPD and, subsequently, the PRRA officer found Ms. Abbasova not to be credible based on the answers she gave in her testimony. … (para. 37, emphasis in original)

Justice Shore also took into account the new evidence filed by the Applicant in the stay application, notwithstanding the fact that this new medical evidence was not before the PRRA officer (paras. 39-43). Furthermore, the Judge found that even if only the preliminary psychological evidence had been considered by the PRRA officer, the officer night have concluded in the Applicant’s favor or at least that there was an issue of credibility/psychological issues which warranted a hearing (para. 44).

Regarding the Gender Guideline, Justice Shore affirmed their applicability as an “aid” in PRRA decisions (paras. 53-54).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Muhari—considering the totality of evidence and discrimination in refugee case

Muhari v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 27 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Scott

Date heard: December 15, 2010

Date decided: January 12, 2011

Counsel for Muhari: Michel Le Brun

Counsel for Minister: Emilie Tremblay

Place of Hearing: Montréal, Quebec

The principal Applicant and his family were of Hungarian ethnicity but Serbian citizenship. They arrived in Canada on visitors visas in January 2008. In February 2008, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, heightening the Applicants fears of persecution based on their ethnicity (paras. 2-5).

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found the Applicants credible but rejected their claim on the basis that they had suffered discrimination, not persecution (para. 7).

Justice Scott reiterated the settled law that the RPD must consider all the evidence on an issue and if rejecting evidence must provide an explanation (paras. 13-15).

In the Applicant’s case, the panel referred to a piece of documentary evidence which, on the whole, supported their case; however, the panel referred only to a part of the document which supported the panel’s conclusions (para. 16). Justice Scott stated that while it was true that the panel did not have to explicitly refer or respond to each piece of documentary evidence, but added “However, where the evidence deals with an element that is crucial to the dispute, the panel’s obligation is quite different. It must refer to that evidence and explain why it did not accept it (Singh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 485 (CanLII), 2009 FC 485, [2009] FCJ No. 616 (QL) at paragraph 15).”

Justice Scott also found that the panel had failed to consider the cumulative effect of severe discrimination, which may amount to persecution (paras. 23-25).

JUDICIAL REVIEW GRANTED

Premaratne—unusual remedy

Premaratne v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 30

Judge: Justice Snider

Date heard: January 11, 2011

Date decided: January 12, 2011

Counsel for Premaratne: T. Viresh Fernando

Counsel for Minister: Kareena R. Wilding

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant was a 28-year-old citizen of Sri Lanka who applied for a study permit to allow her to come attend an eight-month course at George Brown College (para. 1). The Officer denied the request, in part due to a misapprehension of the evidence on the Applicant’s uncle in Canada (para. 2).

This case is unusual in that the Respondent conceded the error and submitted that the appropriate remedy would be to send the application back to be re-determined by a different Officer (para. 3). This is, in fact, the default remedy in immigration judicial reviews (para 5).

The Applicant, however, requested a range of additional remedies:

1. An order directing the Respondent to reconsider the Applicant’s application for a student visa within 30 days of order;

2. An order that, if the Respondent has any concerns with respect to the Applicant’s application, the Applicant be apprised of those specific concerns in writing, within three days, and the Respondent provide the Applicant 15 days in which to respond in writing;

3. An order that the Applicant not be charged additional fees;

4. An order that the Respondent shall adopt non-arbitrary and unbiased criteria for evaluation of student visa;

5. An order that the Respondent adopt procedures to ensure that the decision making process is free of ethnic and religious bias and those procedures be made available forthwith to the Applicant and publicized in Sri Lanka;

6. An order that the Respondent shall not permit the opinions or advice of locally engaged staff, with respect to the authenticity of a visa application, be relied upon by any designated decision maker;

7. An order that all visa applications be made only by properly trained and qualified Canadian visa officers;

8. An order prohibiting the Respondent from defacing passports of persons refused a visa; and

9. An order for costs. (para 4)

Justice Snider noted that re-determination is the default remedy, and stated that she was not prepared to order any of the additional remedies, except an order that the Applicant not be required to pay additional fees (para. 6). Justice Snider also gave her opinion of the other remedies requested:

Regarding #1, she would not so order because the applicant bears the burden of supporting the application, and the case law was already clear as to when an officer must provide the applicant with a chance to respond (para. 8.1).

Regarding #2, Justice Snider found that it was not proper for the court to make an order about the timing of the decision, particularly as the original decision had been made in a timely fashion (para. 8.2).

Regarding #4, Justice Snider declined to make an order that amounted to ordering the Respondent to make a legally valid decision: “It is presumed that the visa officer who decides this matter will make a determination in an impartial, unbiased manner having regard to all of the evidence, the Respondent’s Guidelines and the existing jurisprudence. That is simply a matter of law and common sense; no order is required or appropriate.” (para. 8.4)

Regarding #5, Justice Snider declined to make an order as there was no information before her that visa officers were unqualified or untrained.

Regarding #6, Justice Snider stated that she was not persuaded that the Officer “relied on, or was unduly influenced by, ‘the opinions or advice of locally engaged staff’” (para. 8.6).

Regarding #7, the request for costs, she found there were no “special reasons” as required by the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules (para. 8.7).

While finding in the Applicant’s favour, Justice Snider also expressed concern with the allegations made by the Applicant towards the Officer, e.g. of criminality and perjury (paras. 10-13).

JUDICIAL REVIEW GRANTED

Tuesday, May 24, 2011

Republicans have souls, Minnesota edition

From BoingBoing: Minnesota GOP legislator makes passionate speech in support of marriage equality

Few things in life will make me tear up faster than people whose politics I disagree with generally, passionately and courageously supporting a universal human right. Gives a little boost to my waning hope for the human race.

Thursday, May 19, 2011

Persaud–wrong application of Mobil Oil

Persaud v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 31 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Hughes

Date heard: January 11, 2011

Date decided: January 12, 2011

Counsel for Persaud: Robert Blanshay

Counsel for Minister: Brad Gotkin

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant was a citizen of Guyana who had married a Canadian citizen and been sponsored and came to Canada as a permanent resident in October 2003 (para. 2). In September 2006, the Applicant was interviewed by a Minister’s Delegate (MD); she was not advised of the purpose of the interview, did not have counsel and was not advised that she could have counsel (para. 3). From that interview the MD produced a “Narrative Memoranda” which referred to the interview and a statutory declaration from the husband which was said to be, but was not, attached (para. 3). The MD recommended deportation.

Before the Immigration Division, the Applicant’s counsel argued that the interview was improper and that the absence of the husband’s statutory declaration was another error (para. 4).

The ID gave a written decision in June 2008 that the Applicant was inadmissible as her marriage was not genuine, or in the alternative if it had been entered into in good faith the Applicant had later failed to disclose its breakdown. The ID recognized that the interview had been conducted in breach of procedural fairness and therefore gave no weight to alleged contradictions between the evidence given at the interview and elsewhere (para. 5). Nevertheless, the ID found that either the marriage was entered into for immigration purposes, or if it had been genuine at the beginning the Applicant had failed to disclose its subsequent breakdown (para. 5).

On March 29, 2010, the IAD heard the Applicant’s appeal and decided that since the ID found the interview tainted, it ought to have sent the matter back to be re-determined (para. 6). This was especially true since, despite stating later that it was not taking contradictions from the interview into account, the ID decision explicitly referred to one such contradiction. It was this decision of the IAD, which despite its conclusion that the ID had erred dismissed the appeal, which Justice Hughes overturned.

Before rendering a decision the IAD asked for submissions on the Mobil Oil case (para. 8). The IAD held that Mobile Oil was authority for the proposition that “a breach of procedural fairness does not require a new hearing in “special circumstances” where the claim in question is otherwise “hopeless” or the outcome reached was “inevitable”” (para. 17). On that basis, the IAD found that had the ID heard the evidence properly, it still could not have done other than to dismiss the case (para. 10).

However, at the Federal Court both parties agreed that this summary was not correct:

Mobil Oil dealt with a unique set of circumstances where there was a finding of breach of procedural fairness which the Supreme Court found would have required the matter to be sent back for redetermination. However, since the matter that would have been the subject of redetermination was not the subject of the remedies sought, it was determined to be impractical to send it back. (para. 18)

Given that the dismissal was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the law, Justice Hughes granted the judicial review and sent the matter back to be re-determined by the IAD, with a further non-binding recommendation that the IAD refer it back to the ID (para. 21).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Thursday, May 12, 2011

Raina–equivalency of offenses

Raina v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 19 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Heneghan

Date heard: July 13, 2010

Date decided: January 11, 2011

Counsel for Raina: Krassina Kostadinov

Counsel for Minister: Amy Lambiris, Manuel Mendelzon

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant was a citizen of India who claimed refugee protection after coming to Canada in 2006 (para. 2).

Before coming to Canada, the Applicant had been convicted of “indecent assault” in New Zealand in December 2001, and served 2.5 years. At the same time, he was acquitted of the “more serious offence of sexual violence for the same incident” (para. 2).

Before the RPD, the Minister argued that indecent assault was the equivalent of the Canadian crime of “Sexual interference”, referring to s. 151 of the Criminal Code, which states that it could be dealt with summarily (term of 14 days to 18 months) or by indictment (term of 45 days to 10 years) (para. 4).

The RPD found the Applicant’s conviction to be equivalent to “child molestation” and stated without explanation that the punishment could be up to ten years, which the RPD found to create a presumption that the Applicant had committed a serious non-political crime. The RPD rejected the Applicant’s argument that the elements of the offense in New Zealand did not match those in s. 151 of the Criminal Code (paras. 5-6).

Justice Heneghan relied on the FCA decision of Hill v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1987), 73 N.R. 315 for its statement on determining equivalency:

“It seems to me that because of the presence of the words ‘would constitute an offence ... in Canada’, the equivalency can be determined in three ways: - first, by a comparison of the precise wording in each statute both through documents and, if available, through the evidence of an expert or experts in the foreign law and determining therefrom the essential ingredients of the respective offences. Two, by examining the evidence adduced before the adjudicator, both oral and documentary, to ascertain whether or not that evidence was sufficient to establish that the essential ingredients of the offence in Canada had been proven in the foreign proceedings, whether precisely described in the initiating documents or in the statutory provisions in the same words or not. Third, by a combination of one and two.”

On the basis of Hill, Justice Heneghan found that the RPD had failed to apply the proper tests for equivalency (paras. 7-9).

Furthermore, Heneghan J. found that the RPD had erred in using the Applicant’s acquittal on the charge of “sexual violence” to determine whether the conviction was for a serious non-political crime (para. 10). Relying on Bertold v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), 175 F.T.R. 195, Justice Heneghan reiterated that such “references to outstanding criminal charges are inadmissible and violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms…” (para. 11).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Friday, May 06, 2011

Sharpe–fair consideration of the evidence in medical inadmissibility, unusual remedy

Sharpe v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 21  (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Phelan

Date heard: December 15, 2010

Date decided: January 11, 2011

Counsel for Becerra Vazquez: Mr. Michael Greene

Counsel for Minister: Mr. Rick Garvin

Place of Hearing: Calgary, Alberta

This was the second judicial review of the decision that the Applicant’s dependant son was medically inadmissible. The Applicant was the principle applicant in a Federal Skilled Worker application to immigrate from the UK (paras. 1, 3).

The Applicant’s application was commenced in January 2004. The Applicant was requested to, and did, provide medical reports on his son’s condition. In July, 2006, the medical officer (MO) provided the London visa post with an opinion that the son’s condition “might reasonably be expected to cause an ‘excessive demand on Canadian social services’” (paras. 3-5).

In about August 2006, the Applicant received a fairness letter warning them of the excessive demand opinion and inviting them to make further submissions. Therefore in October 2006, the Applicants submitted updated reports from various professionals; “All of the letters and reports were to the same effect; that Conor’s needs were such that he no longer required the health and social services earlier reports suggested he did” (paras. 6-7).

The application was refused on May 9, 2007 on the grounds of excessive demand (para. 8). The Applicant wrote to the London visa office expressing concern that the newer information had not been properly reviewed and undertaking to pay for any special schooling or social services. On May 25, 2007, the London visa office responded that the new information had been taken into consideration in the refusal (paras. 9-10).

Justice Phelan characterized the response of May 25, 2007 thusly: “This response was a barefaced falsehood” (para. 11).

The MO’s opinion, on which the refusal was based, was made in July 2006, before the receipts of various relevant documents (para. 11). The Applicant’s filed an application for judicial review which was discontinued when the Minister offered to reconsider the matter (paras. 12-13).

In October 2008, a second MO forwarded an opinion which was nearly identical to the first (para. 14). In March 2009, a second visa officer (VO) sent a second fairness letter maintaining the contention that the son was medically inadmissible (para. 15). In response, the Applicant submitted further new information on his son’s current educational placement, conditional acceptance to a private school in Alberta, and assessments of how the Alberta education system characterized his disability, e.g. as “mild” (para. 16). The 2nd MO reconsidered in view of the new evidence and forwarded an opinion that the son was not likely to be an excessive demand (para. 17).

However, the 2nd VO challenged the 2nd MO’s decision, the result of which was the 2nd MO changing opinions again, this time finding that the son was severely disabled. (paras. 18-19). The application was again refused (para. 20).

Justice Phelan stated: “There are several problems with the Respondent’s conclusion as to the nature and severity of Conor’s disability quite independent of the shabby treatment the Applicant has experienced at the London Visa Office” (para. 26).

In reviewing the decision, Justice Phelan found that the main consideration was whether the son’s disability was assessed as “severe” or “mild” under Alberta policy (para. 27). The only evidence on that particular point was a report stating explicitly that his disabilities would be considered mild; the 2nd MO could not reject this conclusion without reason (paras. 28-31). The 2nd MO had relied on another report describing the son’s disability as “significant”, but no evidence that “significant” meant “severe” in the context (para. 32). The 2nd MO’s other comments on the expense of educating the son were not relevant (paras. 33-34).

This decision is particularly interesting in that Justice Phelan notes that he is considering retaining jurisdiction to ensure that the reconsideration of the Applicant’s file “is completed as expeditiously and as fairly as possible” (para. 39). Justice Phelan further suggested “may be possible to have one person, acceptable to the parties, conduct the necessary assessment and whose report would bind both parties. The Court’s mediation role could be utilized to assist if the parties so request” (para. 40).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED