Showing posts with label IAD. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IAD. Show all posts

Saturday, November 26, 2011

Summary of February 2011 Cases Part 2: Moretto, Woldeghebrial, Paul

Moretto v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 132

(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc132/2011fc132.html)

Judge: Chief Justice Lutfy; Date heard: January 20, 2011; Date decided: February 4, 2011; Counsel for Moretto: Adrian Huzel; Counsel for Minister: Kimberly Shane; Place of Hearing: Vancouver, British Columbia

Mr. Moretto was an Italian citizen born in 1969, who had lived Canada since before his first birthday. In 1997, following a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, he began developing a criminal record, and in 2002 he became addicted to crack cocaine. In 2009 he was ordered removed, and his appeal to the IAD was unsuccessful.

This refusal by the IAD was the issue of the JR application. The Chief justice found that the IAD Member had misapprehended the evidence, in particular the hardship to Mr. Moretto if removed. The Member assumed that he could reintegrate into Italian society, despite his having only vague memories of a single vacation there. The Member did not properly consider how separation from his family would cause further deterioration of his condition, and wrongly assumed that this support could be taken over by his Italian relatives, whom he did not know. The Member also failed to consider Mr. Moretto’s relationship with his daughter.

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Woldeghebrial v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 126

(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc126/2011fc126.html)

Judge: Justice O’Reilly; Date heard: January 18, 2011; Date decided: February 4, 2011; Counsel for Woldeghebrial: Clifford Luyt; Counsel for Minister: Margherita Braccio; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

Ms. Woldeghebrial claimed protection on the basis of persecution in Ethiopia as a) a person of Eritrean ethnicity and b) a person with serious mental health challenges.

The RPD found that Eritreans are threated badly in Ethiopia, and denied basic rights, but found that this amounted to discrimination rather than persecution. Furthermore the RPD found that the mentally ill did not receive adequate treatment in Ethiopia and were persecuted as being “evil”, but that Ms. Woldeghebrial had family to care for her.

Justice O’Reilly found that the RPD erred in that it did not explain why the poor treatment of Eritreans could only be considered discrimination and not persecution, and furthermore failed to explain how the ability of her family to supplement inadequate medical care would protect her from persecution. Therefore the claim was ordered re-heard.

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Paul v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 135

(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc135/2011fc135.html)

Judge: Justice Boivin; Date heard: January 25, 2011; Date decided: February 7, 2011; Counsel for Paul: Viken G. Artinian; Counsel for Minister: Thi My Dung Tran; Place of Hearing: Montréal, Quebec

Justice Boivin overturned a negative decision of an H&C claim. The Applicants were a mother and son who had faced domestic abuse in St. Vincent. They had previous filed a refugee claim, which was denied. The Applicant’s were also subject to a removal order and an arrest warrant had been issued. While the issue was before the Court, the Applicants had presented themselves to CBSA and had been released. The Court considered the “clean hands” issue, and found that the facts were distinguishable from other cases, e.g. Wong v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 569, and that the Applicant’s had not been underground.

The Court also found that while the officer had properly set out the test for H&C, the test had not properly been applied. The officer set the threshold for risk too high. The officer conflated the H&C test with the test for the PRRA, and assessed risk instead of hardship.

Summary of February 2011 Cases Part 1: Allen, Gunaratnam, Aghdam

Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Allen, 2011 FC 124

(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc106/2011fc106.html)

Judge: Justice Heneghan; Date heard: January 27, 2011; Date decided: February 3, 2011; Counsel for Allen: Omar Khan; Counsel for Minister: Maria Burgos; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

Justice Heneghan denied the Minister’s application to overturn the decision of the IAD staying a removal order against the Respondent Mr. Allen.

The Respondent was a PR and citizen of Jamaica with a criminal record in Canada including crimes of a sexual nature against a minor. A removal order was issued by the ID. Mr. Allen did not challenge the legal validity of the order, but asked the IAD to grant a stay on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. The IAD noted that the appellant had not had further problems since this release from custody three years previous, and was successfully receiving psychological treatment (the continuation of which was a condition of the stay of removal).

The Applicant stated that the IAD did not have expertise in weighing rehabilitation. The Court found, on the contrary, that all the factors in Ribic (as approved in Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3) and dismissed the application.

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Gunaratnam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 122

(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc122/2011fc122.html)

Judge: Justice Mactavish; Date heard: January 26, 2011; Date decided: February 3, 2011; Counsel for Gunaratnam: Barbara Jackman; Counsel for Minister: Ada Mok; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

Justice Mactavish overturned the denial of a pre-removal risk assessment of the Applicant, who was a young male Tamil alleging persecution by the EPDP who believed he was an LTTE supporter. The PRRA officer made credibility findings against the Applicant because he had given his parents’ address as the same address since 2009, but also stated that they’d been in hiding. The Applicant stated to the Court that the address he gave was his parents’ permanent address.

Furthermore, the PRRA officer relied on documentary evidence that contradicted the Applicant’s application without putting the contradictions to the applicant. The Court noted that putting contradictory evidence to an applicant may be a requirement of procedural fairness, particularly where a) the contradictory evidence is not readily available in common sources, and b) the country is in a state of turmoil and country conditions rapidly changed (citing Pathmanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 885).

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Aghdam v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 131

(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc131/2011fc131.html)

Judge: Justice Mactavish; Date heard: February 2, 2011; Date decided: February 4, 2011; Counsel for Aghdam: Raoul Boulakia; Counsel for Minister: James Todd & Sybil Thompson; Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario

Justice Mactavish granted a mandamus application for Ministerial Relief. Ms. Aghdam had applied for permanent residence in 1992, having been found to be a refugee in 1986. She was interviewed regarding her possible involvement in Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), which is currently a listed terrorist entity. She was interviewed in 1993 and 1996. In 2000 she was advised that her application might be denied. She was interviewed again in 2001, which she believed but the Court disagreed was the time when Ministerial relief began to be considered.

In 2005, Ms. Aghdam filed a written application for Ministerial Relief (under a provision of the IRPA which states that a person who is technically inadmissible may be admitted to Canada if they satisfy the Minister that their presence would not be detrimental to the national interest). She was interviewed in 2005 and made further submissions in response to a negative recommendation. In the intervening 6 years, there did not appear to be movement on the file, and it did not appear that there was an ongoing investigation to justify the delay (although further submissions were made shortly before the hearing of the application).

The Court found that the delay was unreasonable. Furthermore, it found that it was so unreasonable that it made an award of costs against the Minister in the amount of $3500.

Friday, September 30, 2011

Dobson—ignored evidence of genuine marriage

Dobson v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 121 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Heneghan

Date heard: November 10, 2010

Date decided: February 2, 2011

Counsel for Dobson: David Matas

Counsel for Minister: Aliyah Rahaman

Place of Hearing: Winnipeg, MB

The Applicant applied for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Appeal Division upholding a visa officer’s decision refusing the permanent resident application of her sponsored spouse (para. 1).

The Applicant was a Canadian living in Edmonton. The spouse, Mr. Ali, was a 40-year-old citizen of Egypt. He had been married before; his first marriage was in Egypt and he had one child from it, his second marriage was in the United States in an apparent attempt to get status there, and his third was a common-law marriage with a woman with whom he had three children, and during which he fathered a fourth child with his first ex-wife (paras. 2-4).

The Applicant met her husband in September 2006 and their relationship began soon after.  She visited him in New York. He was not able to obtain a visa to visit her in Canada. They married in March 2007 and their application was refused in January 2008 on the basis that it was not a genuine marriage (paras. 5-7).

The Applicant and her husband maintained written and telephonic contact and she visited him seven times between March 2007 and August 2008. Their daughter was born in October 2008 in Edmonton; at which time Mr. Ali had moved back to Egypt (paras. 8-9). The IAD hearings took place in May, July, and August 2009, and in August 20098 the Applicant and daughter visited Mr. Ali and his family in Egypt (paras. 10-11).

The IAD considered the daughter and the evidence of ongoing contact, and nevertheless found that the marriage was not genuine (paras. 12-13). Justice Henghan found the IAD made factual findings that were “unreasonable, as they lack justification and intelligibility” (para. 16).

The IAD found the Applicant and her husband “had not addressed their religious incompatibility” (para. 17). She was a casually observant member of the United Church, and he was a non-practising Muslim (para. 18). They testified that there plan was to expose their daughter to both religions and allow her to choose; Heneghan found there was sufficient evidence that they has “addressed their religious differences”, such as they were, and that the IAD’s conclusion on this point was unreasonable (para.  19).

The IAD found that the Applicant had not discussed her husband’s fathering a child with his ex-wife; Henghan found to the contrary that the Applicant had testified that she had specifically discussed this with him (paras. 20-21).

The IAD found that “the Applicant and Mr. Ali had not discussed their future plans, and that the Applicant had not taken sufficient steps to integrate Mr. Ali into her life” (para. 22). Heneghan found that there was evidence of discussion of future plans and of integrating their finances, and that given the fact the Mr. Ali lived outside of Canada, “it is not clear how the Applicant would have further integrated Mr. Ali into her daily life” (paras. 23-24).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Thursday, May 19, 2011

Persaud–wrong application of Mobil Oil

Persaud v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 31 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Hughes

Date heard: January 11, 2011

Date decided: January 12, 2011

Counsel for Persaud: Robert Blanshay

Counsel for Minister: Brad Gotkin

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant was a citizen of Guyana who had married a Canadian citizen and been sponsored and came to Canada as a permanent resident in October 2003 (para. 2). In September 2006, the Applicant was interviewed by a Minister’s Delegate (MD); she was not advised of the purpose of the interview, did not have counsel and was not advised that she could have counsel (para. 3). From that interview the MD produced a “Narrative Memoranda” which referred to the interview and a statutory declaration from the husband which was said to be, but was not, attached (para. 3). The MD recommended deportation.

Before the Immigration Division, the Applicant’s counsel argued that the interview was improper and that the absence of the husband’s statutory declaration was another error (para. 4).

The ID gave a written decision in June 2008 that the Applicant was inadmissible as her marriage was not genuine, or in the alternative if it had been entered into in good faith the Applicant had later failed to disclose its breakdown. The ID recognized that the interview had been conducted in breach of procedural fairness and therefore gave no weight to alleged contradictions between the evidence given at the interview and elsewhere (para. 5). Nevertheless, the ID found that either the marriage was entered into for immigration purposes, or if it had been genuine at the beginning the Applicant had failed to disclose its subsequent breakdown (para. 5).

On March 29, 2010, the IAD heard the Applicant’s appeal and decided that since the ID found the interview tainted, it ought to have sent the matter back to be re-determined (para. 6). This was especially true since, despite stating later that it was not taking contradictions from the interview into account, the ID decision explicitly referred to one such contradiction. It was this decision of the IAD, which despite its conclusion that the ID had erred dismissed the appeal, which Justice Hughes overturned.

Before rendering a decision the IAD asked for submissions on the Mobil Oil case (para. 8). The IAD held that Mobile Oil was authority for the proposition that “a breach of procedural fairness does not require a new hearing in “special circumstances” where the claim in question is otherwise “hopeless” or the outcome reached was “inevitable”” (para. 17). On that basis, the IAD found that had the ID heard the evidence properly, it still could not have done other than to dismiss the case (para. 10).

However, at the Federal Court both parties agreed that this summary was not correct:

Mobil Oil dealt with a unique set of circumstances where there was a finding of breach of procedural fairness which the Supreme Court found would have required the matter to be sent back for redetermination. However, since the matter that would have been the subject of redetermination was not the subject of the remedies sought, it was determined to be impractical to send it back. (para. 18)

Given that the dismissal was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the law, Justice Hughes granted the judicial review and sent the matter back to be re-determined by the IAD, with a further non-binding recommendation that the IAD refer it back to the ID (para. 21).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED