Showing posts with label PRRA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PRRA. Show all posts

Sunday, July 15, 2012

Zazai—H&Cs where applicant has a TRP and may get a PRRA

Zazai v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 162 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice O’Keefe; Date heard: January 16, 2012; Date decided: February 7, 2012; Counsel for Zazai: Krassina Kostadinov; Counsel for Minister: Martin Anderson; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario.

The applicant was an Afghan citizen whose application for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (H&C) had been denied.

At the time of the court hearing, he had been married to a Canadian citizen since 2002, had three Canadian children, and was expecting a fourth (para. 3).

The applicant had arrived in Canada in November 1993 as a stowaway, aged 25. In a refugee claim, he had claimed he had been a member of KHAD (para. 4).

Because KHAD had committed crimes against humanity, his refugee claim was denied on the basis of exclusion, and leave was denied at the Federal Court in 1996 (paras. 5-6). An application as a post-determination refugee claimant in Canada was also denied for inadmissibility in 2001 (para. 6).

A deportation order was issued in January 2002. The applicant sought leave, which was granted in May 2003, but reversed on appeal in March 2004. The case went back to the Federal Court and then back to the Court of Appeal in Zazai v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),2005 FCA 303 (para. 7).

A July 2003 H&C was denied in April 2004 (para. 8). In a new H&C in May 2006, the applicant claimed that his statements about membership in KHAD were false, and he had in fact been a student (para. 9). In updated submissions in March 2009, the applicant explained that his children could not live in Afghanistan because of the danger there, and his wife, who was originally from Afghanistan, because she had fled a forced marriage to a powerful warlord (para. 10).

The applicant was granted a TRP in February 2010, and began reporting at CBSA’s request in May 2011. There was also a PRRA from June 2006, on which no decision had ever been made (paras. 11-13).

The H&C was denied in May 2011. The officer found that he was would by the previous decisions on inadmissibility (paras. 14-16).

The officer considered a number of factors going to establishment and family separation in Canada (para. 17). The officer then went on to consider that “the risks to the applicant should he be removed were not currently relevant due to his valid TRP. Further, should his TRP be removed in the future, the applicant would be offered a restricted PRRA prior to his removal.” (paras. 17-18)

Balancing establishment and the best interests of the children against the applicant’s membership in KHAD (a limited a brutal purpose organization), the officer found there was not sufficient reason to grant an exemption (paras. 19-21).

Justice O’Keefe reviewed the jurisprudence on best interests of the child (BIC):

…It is not sufficient to merely state that the interests have been taken into account or to simply refer to the children’s interests or to the relationships with the children involved (see Hawthorne v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 475 (CanLII), 2002 FCA 475, [2003] 2 FC 555 at paragraph 32). The children’s interests must be well identified and must be defined and examined with a great deal of attention (see Hawthorne above, at paragraph 32; and Legault v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 125 (CanLII), 2002 FCA 125, [2002] FCJ No 457 at paragraphs 12 and 31).

The best interest analysis requires officers to demonstrate that they are alert, alive and sensitive to the best interests of the children. In Kolosovs v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 165 (CanLII), 2008 FC 165, [2008] FCJ No 211, Mr. Justice Douglas Campbell described the meaning of being alert as demonstrating “an awareness of the child’s best interests by noting the ways in which those interests are implicated” (at paragraph 9). Being “alive” to a child's best interests means demonstrating that the officer understands the perspective of each of the participants in a given fact scenario, including the child if this can reasonably be determined (see Kolosovs above, at paragraph 11). Finally, being “sensitive” means clearly articulating the child’s suffering that would result from a negative decision and whether, together with a consideration of other factors, that suffering warrants H&C relief (see Kolosovs above, at paragraph 12). (paras. 51-52)

Justice O’Keefe also notes that BIC does not automatically “prevail over other considerations” and the weight given to BIC is up to the officer (para. 53).

In this case, Justice O’Keefe found that while the officer had acknowledged that the applicant’s TRP could be lifted, he found that this was countered by the fact that the applicant would be offered a PRRA before removal. Referring to Hinzman v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FCA 177, Justice O’Keefe noted that PRRAs were significantly different from H&Cs (para. 59). Therefore, the officer’s reliance on the prospect of a future PRRA was faulty, since that process would not take BIC into consideration, and further since the applicant’s TRP could be cancelled at any time (para. 60).

Saturday, July 14, 2012

Siavoosh—stay of removal during hunger strike

Siavoosh v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 149 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Shore; Date heard: February 3, 2012; Date decided: February 3, 2012; Counsel for Siavoosh:Robin L. Seligman; Counsel for Minister: Michael Butterfield;Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario (by tele-conference)

The applicant was an Iranian national of Kurdish ethnicity and a practitioner of Sahaja Yoga [it is unclear from the decision what religion he professed, but risk due in part to religious beliefs was a factor in his fear of return].

The decision is brief and lacks detail, but Justice Shore granted a stay until Citizenship and Immigration Canada made a decision on a humanitarian and compassionate application and a second PRRA, and until the Court had decided on an application for judicial review of an officer’s refusal to defer removal.

He—reasonable treatment of evidence on house churches versus state sanctioned churches

He v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 148 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Rennie; Date heard: January 17, 2012; Date decided: February 3, 2012; Counsel for He: Catherine Bruce; Counsel for Minister: Lldiko Erdei; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario.

The applicant was a Chinese citizen and Christian, who attended an (illegal) house church. On a business trip to Canada, he was advised by his family back in China that the Public Security Bureau was looking for him. He made a claim for refugee status in February 2007, and it was denied in March 2009 because the Refugee Protection Division did not believe he was a Chinese citizen, and therefore rejected his claim without considering the merits (paras. 1-2)

The applicant filed a PRRA, and the PRRA officer accepted his identity as a citizen of China (para. 3). The PRRA officer also accepted that the applicant was a practicing Christian, however, the PRRA officer:

…concluded that the applicant had not put forth “objective documentary evidence to support that his profile in China is similar to those that currently face a danger of torture, or a risk to life, or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in that country.”  The PRRA Officer further concluded that “the evidence before [him] does not support that the Chinese authorities are aware [that the applicant is a practicing Christian]”. (para. 5)

Justice Rennie relies on a decision of Justice Zinn on similar facts (Zhu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1066). In that case, Justice Zinn had noted that it was an error “not to take into account the doctrinal differences between the state sanctioned churches and unregistered churches” (para. 12).

The PRRA officer relied on evidence of increasing tolerance towards members of stat-sanctioned churches, but failed to differentiate the fact that the applicant was a member of an illegal house church (paras. 13-14).

Justice Rennie also cited another case on similar facts, a decision of Justice Russell in Yin v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 544.

Monday, November 28, 2011

Summary of February 2011 Cases Part 4: B386, Leal Alvarez, Demiraj

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. B386, 2011 FC 140

(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc140/2011fc140.html)

Judge: Chief Justice Lutfy; Date heard: January 19, 2011; Date decided: February 8, 2011; Counsel for B386: Gabriel Chand; Counsel for Minister: Hilla Aharon; Place of Hearing: Vancouver, British Columbia

This was a decision of the Federal Court upholding the decision of the Immigration Division releasing one of the persons who arrived on the MV Sun Sea. The  ID Member had allegedly erred by deciding that the person could be released with a bod and terms and conditions. She then offered Minister’s counsel a chance to cross-examine the bondsperson, and Minister's counsel declined. It is not clear from the decision what the Minister-Applicant's objection was to this, but it may have been the appearance that the decision had been made before the Minister's counsel was able to cross-examine the proposed bondsperson. In any event, the Court stated that detention reviews are often “rough-and-ready” proceedings and that both sides had made submissions, so this was not an error sufficient to overturn the decision.

The Minister-Applicant also argued that the Member had ignored the detained person’s possible vulnerability to smugglers or traffickers, having arrived by Canada on a boat, or the person’s ties to the community. On the contrary, the Court found that the Member had considered both these points.

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Leal Alvarez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 154

(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc154/2011fc154.html)

Judge: Justice Rennie; Date heard: January 19, 2011; Date decided: February 9, 2011; Counsel for Leal Alvarez: Michael Crane; Counsel for Minister: Deborah Drukarsh; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicants were citizens of Colombia, and the principal Applicant was the only one alleging persecution, on the basis violence and threats from the guerilla group FARC. The RPD found against the Applicant on credibility: the Applicant was a secretary or assistant in a program run by the municipal government, and the RPD found that she was too low-placed to be targeted by FARC. Justice Rennie found the the RPD had erred in focusing on the Applicant’s job title and not the uncontested evidence that she worked with villages and displaced persons, specifically against FARC.

Justice Rennie also found that the RPD made two legal errors. the Applicant alleged she had been beaten and kidnapped by FARC, and the RPD stated that it needed “conclusive proof” of this event. The RPD also stated that it was not satisfied that the Applicant was targeted “on a balance of probabilities”. The Court noted that both of these tests are too high; the correct test is whether there is a “serious possibility of persecution or harm”.

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Demiraj v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 161

(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc161/2011fc161.html)

Judge: Justice Heneghan; Date heard: February 8, 2011; Date decided: February 10, 2011; Counsel for Demiraj: Jonathan Fedder; Counsel for Minister: David Cranton; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicants were Albanian citizens who claimed protection in Canada on the basis of a blood-feud. They submitted a PRRA and an H&C, both of which were denied. Justice Henghan upheld the negative PRRA, but on the H&C, found that the officer had applied the wrong test: “The Officer reasons that because there is state protection available in Albania, the Applicants face no risk to life, and therefore, that there will be no undue, undeserved or disproportionate hardship.” This conflation of the tests, and the underlying assumption that the existence of state protection means that there is no hardship is an error of law.

Saturday, November 26, 2011

Summary of February 2011 Cases Part 1: Allen, Gunaratnam, Aghdam

Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Allen, 2011 FC 124

(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc106/2011fc106.html)

Judge: Justice Heneghan; Date heard: January 27, 2011; Date decided: February 3, 2011; Counsel for Allen: Omar Khan; Counsel for Minister: Maria Burgos; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

Justice Heneghan denied the Minister’s application to overturn the decision of the IAD staying a removal order against the Respondent Mr. Allen.

The Respondent was a PR and citizen of Jamaica with a criminal record in Canada including crimes of a sexual nature against a minor. A removal order was issued by the ID. Mr. Allen did not challenge the legal validity of the order, but asked the IAD to grant a stay on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. The IAD noted that the appellant had not had further problems since this release from custody three years previous, and was successfully receiving psychological treatment (the continuation of which was a condition of the stay of removal).

The Applicant stated that the IAD did not have expertise in weighing rehabilitation. The Court found, on the contrary, that all the factors in Ribic (as approved in Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3) and dismissed the application.

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Gunaratnam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 122

(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc122/2011fc122.html)

Judge: Justice Mactavish; Date heard: January 26, 2011; Date decided: February 3, 2011; Counsel for Gunaratnam: Barbara Jackman; Counsel for Minister: Ada Mok; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

Justice Mactavish overturned the denial of a pre-removal risk assessment of the Applicant, who was a young male Tamil alleging persecution by the EPDP who believed he was an LTTE supporter. The PRRA officer made credibility findings against the Applicant because he had given his parents’ address as the same address since 2009, but also stated that they’d been in hiding. The Applicant stated to the Court that the address he gave was his parents’ permanent address.

Furthermore, the PRRA officer relied on documentary evidence that contradicted the Applicant’s application without putting the contradictions to the applicant. The Court noted that putting contradictory evidence to an applicant may be a requirement of procedural fairness, particularly where a) the contradictory evidence is not readily available in common sources, and b) the country is in a state of turmoil and country conditions rapidly changed (citing Pathmanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 885).

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Aghdam v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 131

(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc131/2011fc131.html)

Judge: Justice Mactavish; Date heard: February 2, 2011; Date decided: February 4, 2011; Counsel for Aghdam: Raoul Boulakia; Counsel for Minister: James Todd & Sybil Thompson; Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario

Justice Mactavish granted a mandamus application for Ministerial Relief. Ms. Aghdam had applied for permanent residence in 1992, having been found to be a refugee in 1986. She was interviewed regarding her possible involvement in Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), which is currently a listed terrorist entity. She was interviewed in 1993 and 1996. In 2000 she was advised that her application might be denied. She was interviewed again in 2001, which she believed but the Court disagreed was the time when Ministerial relief began to be considered.

In 2005, Ms. Aghdam filed a written application for Ministerial Relief (under a provision of the IRPA which states that a person who is technically inadmissible may be admitted to Canada if they satisfy the Minister that their presence would not be detrimental to the national interest). She was interviewed in 2005 and made further submissions in response to a negative recommendation. In the intervening 6 years, there did not appear to be movement on the file, and it did not appear that there was an ongoing investigation to justify the delay (although further submissions were made shortly before the hearing of the application).

The Court found that the delay was unreasonable. Furthermore, it found that it was so unreasonable that it made an award of costs against the Minister in the amount of $3500.

Friday, September 30, 2011

Oliveros Rubiano—no need to exhaust state protection if reasonable efforts made

Oliveros Rubiano v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 106 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice O’Keefe

Date heard: September 22, 2010

Date decided: February 2, 2011

Counsel for Oliveros Rubiano: Jonathan E. Fedder

Counsel for Minister: Kareena Wilding & Veronica Cham

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

Decision Under Review: negative pre-removal risk assessment

The Applicant fled Colombia with his family, after having become the target of an extortion scheme by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and having reported it to the Colombian army (para. 4). He suffered detention, threats, the murder of family members, and in 2005 he himself was shot, which he reported (paras. 4-5). The family fled to Ecuador in September 2005, but upon finding out that there was no assistance with food, shelter, or legal counsel, the returned to Colombia (para. 6).

In April 2006, the Applicant and his family entered the United States as visitors (para. 7). They travelled to the Canadian border but the Applicant was denied eligibility to make a refugee claim in Canada because of the Safe Third Country Agreement. He applied for but was refused asylum in the US, and he subsequently crossed the border illegally and made a claim in Canada which was also refused (para. 7).

In November 20098 the Applicant filed a pre-removal risk assessment application and expressly requested an oral hearing (para. 8).

The officer found that the Applicant had not submitted sufficient evidence that he had been or was targeted, or that he had a similar situation to his cousins who had been murdered (paras. 9-10). The officer gave little weight to the affidavits of his mother and cousins, finding that they were interested parties and that their evidence was not supported by the objective evidence (para. 11). The officer found the Applicant had not demonstrated subjective fear, in that he had returned to Colombia from Ecuador (para. 12). Furthermore, the Applicant still had family in Colombia who had not been targeted, and failed to show a lack of state protection (paras. 13-14).

Citing Farias (Farias v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),2008 FC 1035, cited at para. 34), Katwaru (Katwaru v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2007 FC 612, cited at para. 35), and Gilvaja (Gilvaja v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 598 cited at para. 38) Justice O’Keefe found that the PRRA officer had “erred in law by requiring the applicant to show that he had exhausted all avenues of state protection”, since the Applicant had shown that he had made reasonable efforts to no avail (para. 39).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Beharry—failure to assess actual adequacy of state protection, not merely efforts made

Beharry v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 111 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Mactavish

Date heard: January 27, 2011

Date decided: February 1, 2011

Counsel for Beharry: Krassina Kostadinov

Counsel for Minister: Veronica Cham

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant and her two children, citizens of Guyana, filed an application for pre-removal risk assessment. a previous refugee claim had been rejected on the grounds that state protection was available, although the RPD believed that they had been subjected to “brutal home invasion, during which Ms. Beharry was physically and sexually assaulted” (para. 1). The PRRA Officer rejected the application on the basis that state protection was available (para. 2).

The family submitted evidence that the situation in Guyana had worsened since their refugee hearing (para. 5). The officer reviewed the  evidence and ‘concluded that the government of Guyana had “made efforts’ to address crime in Guyana” (para. 8). Justice Mactavish found that it was an error for the officer to focus on whether the government was making efforts, when he ought to have assessed “whether those efforts have actually translated into adequate state protection” (para. 9, citing Carillo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 94). Furthermore, Mactavish found that the evidence did not lead to a reasonable finding that there was adequate state protection.

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Tuesday, September 20, 2011

Davis—failure to assess hardship, ignoring psychological evidence

Davis v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 97 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Mactavish

Date heard: January 26, 2011

Date decided: January 27, 2011

Counsel for Davis: Michael Crane

Counsel for Minister: Laoura Christodoulides

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant was a failed refugee claimant from St. Vincent; the RPD did not take issue with the history she presented of “significant physical and sexual abuse as a young child” (paras. 1-4). Her H&C/PRRA, which included psychological reports, argued that she would suffer a deterioration of her mental health if removed and if separated from her father who lives in Canada.

A previous application had been denied, and that decision was overturned on judicial review in 2009 (paras. 5-7). That decision was overturned because the officer had relied on a WHO document not put to the Applicant.

In this second decision, the new officer “committed precisely the same error as the first Officer” (para. 9). The second officer relied on a different report, this one from the Pan American Health Organization, which was sufficiently detailed and technical that it ought to have been put to the Applicant (paras. 8-10). This was implicitly contrasted with human rights reports which are general and do not need to be put to the applicant.

Furthermore, the Applicant had put evidence before the PRRA officer which was both more recent and more direct, as it came from the St. Vincent government (paras. 10-14).

Furthermore, the officer ignored evidence of the Applicant’s emotional dependence on her father, drawing conclusions in direct opposition to the psychological evidence (paras. 15-17).

Finally, the officer erred in focusing on the availability of mental health care in St. Vincent, without assessing “whether requiring Ms. Davis to return to St. Vincent to access that care would amount to undue, undeserved or disproportionate hardship.” (paras. 18-19)

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Mings-Edwards—PRRA officer ignored one of two grounds of risk presented

Mings-Edwards v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 90(CanLII)

Mings-Edwards v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 91 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Mactavish

Date heard: Januray 25, 2011

Date decided: January 26, 2011

Counsel for Mings-Edwards: Aadil Mangalji

Counsel for Minister: Kareena Wilding

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant filed a pre-removal risk assessment on the basis of two grounds: fear of her abusive spouse, and her status as an HIV+ woman (para. 1).

The PRRA officer focused on the availability of state protection in Jamaica; Justice Mactavish found that this unreasonably ignored the second ground (para. 2).

The PRRA officer disregarded the single personal document attesting to the difficulty the Applicant would face as an HIV+ woman in Jamaica, stating that it was uncorroborated and speculative; he ignored the large volume of general country conditions evidence presented which corroborated her evidence (paras. 3-7). The officer wrongly disregarded this country conditions evidence as “generalized” (para. 7). The officer failed to address whether the discrimination described amounts to persecution or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment (para. 8).

Furthermore, the officer stated that there was state protection in Jamaica, but the entire analysis of state protection referred to the domestic violence ground and not the HIV status ground (para. 9).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Thursday, July 28, 2011

Borisovna Abbasova–applicability of Gender Guidelines and failure to consider psychological issues in credibility

Borisovna Abbasova v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 43 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Shore

Date heard: January 10, 2011

Date decided: January 14, 2011

Counsel for Borisovna Abbasova: Denise Feret

Counsel for Minister: Christine Bernard

Place of Hearing: Montréal, Quebec

This was judicial review of a pre-removal risk assessment decision turning on the Gender Guidelines.

Justice Shore opened the reasons with the following emphatic but convoluted statement: “For decision-makers at all levels, procedural fairness sounds a rarely heard alarm, and that alarm must be heard if injustice is not to be done.” (para. 1)

The Applicant was a Russian national who alleged persecution at the hands of her common-law partner, in the form of domestic abuse complicated by the fact that the abuser was a police officer. She further alleged having been mislead by a fraudulent non-lawyer (para. 10).

Her refugee claim was denied in February 2009 (para. 12).

The Applicant filed a PRRA in August 2009, and it was denied in April 2010 (para. 13). A stay of removal was granted in June 2010 (para. 14).

The PRRA officer assigned no weight to the Applicant’s new evidence (para. 15).

The issues were whether the officer erred in not considering the relevant evidence and/or erred in failing to apply the Refugee Protection Division’s Guideline 7 of women fearing gender-related persecution (para. 16).

Justice Shore approved of the PRRA officer’s giving no weight to documentation which, while it post-dated the hearing, “simply echoed the information previously submitted” (paras. 28-30).

However, the PRRA officer also gave no weight to a post-hearing psychological assessment of the Applicant (para. 30). Justice Shore noted that the RPD had found the Applicant not credible, but the psychological report clarified this issue; the PRRA officer ought to have taken into consideration “Possible evidence of the applicant’s inability to testify” (paras. 30-31).

Justice Shore noted that:

It is not for the Court to reassess the evidence submitted to the PRRA officer and that is not what it intends to do; nonetheless, the developments in Ms. Abbasova’s evidence, particularly regarding her psychological condition, could have been considered to be relevant if they had been analyzed. More specifically, in her particular case, as shown, a psychological problem apparently impaired Ms. Abbasova’s ability to testify. That evidence could have been central to the determination of credibility, considering that the RPD and, subsequently, the PRRA officer found Ms. Abbasova not to be credible based on the answers she gave in her testimony. … (para. 37, emphasis in original)

Justice Shore also took into account the new evidence filed by the Applicant in the stay application, notwithstanding the fact that this new medical evidence was not before the PRRA officer (paras. 39-43). Furthermore, the Judge found that even if only the preliminary psychological evidence had been considered by the PRRA officer, the officer night have concluded in the Applicant’s favor or at least that there was an issue of credibility/psychological issues which warranted a hearing (para. 44).

Regarding the Gender Guideline, Justice Shore affirmed their applicability as an “aid” in PRRA decisions (paras. 53-54).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Friday, October 01, 2010

Zemo – PRRA refusal errors on new evidence and no hearing

The applicant, a female former refugee claimant from Eritrea, made a pre-removal-risk-assessment application on the basis that she was a member of the Eritrean Liberation Front and a member of an unregistered church, and as such would be at risk if returned to Eritrea. Both grounds had previously been advanced and rejected. She also made a third, new argument, that she would be at risk as a returned refugee claimant.

The Officer rejected the evidence that the applicant was a member of an unregistered church, despite evidence submitted by the applicant:

[17] In the present circumstances and reading the decision as a whole, the Officer’s decision could only stand if the Applicant’s evidence of membership was not believed. There was more than sufficient evidence as to the risk to members of unregistered churches and there was sufficient evidence, if believed, to establish the Applicant’s membership in that type of church.

[18] Therefore, the Officer, having decided the issue on credibility, failed to consider whether a hearing should be held. The Applicant is not entitled per se to a hearing but the Minister is required to consider whether to have a hearing. In that respect there was an error of law because the Officer never turned her mind to that issue. …

The Officer also failed to properly consider the ground of being a returned refugee claimant, which was not raised before the RPD.

Judge: Phelan

Date decided: August 4, 2010

Counsel: Micheal Crane (applicant), Daniel Engel (Minister)