Showing posts with label ignored evidence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ignored evidence. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 07, 2017

Aslanyan: ignoring evidence

Aslanyan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 133

Strickland J., 3 February 2017, online at: http://canlii.ca/t/gxbpq

Decision under review: Refusal of overseas application for work permit as a spouse of a study permit holder

For Applicant: Aleksei Grachev (Toronto)

For Respondent: Tamrat Gebeyehu, Dept. of Justice (Toronto)

The Applicant’s spouse was in Canada on a study permit, and he applied for an open work permit. The Court agreed that he had made submissions with his application – although less clearly than he could have done - that he wanted an open work permit to allow him to work in Canada intermittently during his occasional visits to his family here (paras. 6 and 8). The Applicant had also submitted letters of support – essentially corroborative and character references – as well as submitting and providing evidence that through his job in Russia he was the family’s sole breadwinner, and furthermore that he was the principle carer for his dependent mother and could only be replaced for short periods of time (paras. 11-12).

None of the evidence provided was referenced in the Officer’s “reasons”, which were the FOSS/GCMS notes (para. 13).

The Respondent argued that the Applicant was clearly planning to leave his employment in Russia, as the Officer had determined, because his leave letter stated he had 28 days but his work permit application was for two years (para. 14). The Court found that in the context of the whole application, the Applicant clearly intended to work on-and-off during his visits to Canada, which would be made occasionally over a two-year period (para. 15). The Officer ignored evidence and the decision was thus overturned.

Sunday, July 15, 2012

Delgado Ruiz—ignored evidence that persecutors would continue to pursue

Delgado Ruiz v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 163 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Harrington; Date heard: January 31, 2012; Date decided: February 7, 2012; Counsel for Delgado Ruiz: Cristina Marinelli; Counsel for Minister: Daniel Baum; Place of Hearing: Montréal, Quebec.

The applicants were citizens of Colombia, and the principal applicant worked for the Colombian Embassy in Guatemala, at which position she began receiving threats from members of FARC and Maras to force her to provide documents to their members. When she refused and left her position at the Embassy, she was the victim of further threats and shots were fired at her (paras. 1-2).

The Refugee Protection Division found that the applicants had no status in Guatemala. They further found that while the principal applicant had been in danger, the danger would now have dissipated given the time passed and since she no longer worked for the Colombian government and therefore had nothing they wanted (paras. 3-4).

Justice Harrington found that while the RPD’s conclusion had some logic to it, i.e. that FARC wouldn’t care about the principal applicant anymore, the conclusion ignored evidence before the RPD that FARC would continue to pursue former targets as perceived class enemies regardless of the passage of time (paras. 8-9). Therefore, the RPD fell into the error described in Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 157 FTR 35, [1998] FCJ No 1425 of failing to confront contradictory evidence (para. 10)

Sunday, February 19, 2012

Cetinkaya—wrong definition of torture, reasonable explanation for lack of corroborating documents

Cetinkaya v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 8

http://canlii.ca/en/ca/fct/doc/2012/2012fc8/2012fc8.html

Judge: Justice Russell; Date heard: December 8, 2011; Date decided: January 4, 2012; Counsel for Cetinkaya: Alla Kikinova; Counsel for Minister: Julie Waldman; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario.

The Applicant was a Turkish citizen of Kurdish ethnicity. He alleged a profile as a Kurdish activist who had been tortured by the Turkish authorities. The RPD said that he was not credible, because he had not corroborated his participation in demonstrations with documentary evidence. Furthermore, the RPD found that he had not corroborated his allegations of torture and mistreatment (beatings). This lead the RPD to find that the Applicant was intentionally misleading them. The RPD stated that if the Applicant had been tortured, he would have been more severely hurt.

The Court took issue with a number of the RPD’s findings. The court found that the RPD had unduly relied on the port-of-entry notes to impugn the Applicant’s credibility, noting:

It is an error of the RPD to impugn the credibility of the Applicant on the sole ground that the information provided by the Applicant at the POE interview lacks details. The purpose of the POE interview is to assess whether an individual is eligible and/or admissible to initiate a refugee claim. It is not a part of the claim itself and, consequently, it should not be expected to contain all of the details of the claim (see also Hamdar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC 382 at paragraphs 43 through 48, and Jamil v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2006 FC 792 at paragraph 25.) (para. 51)

The Court also found that, contrary to the RPD’s findings, it was not the Applicant who said at the hearing that he was not tortured, but that rather this was a statement of the panel, and furthermore that it was statement based on a lack of understanding of what torture is.

M: So why I am trying to ask you this question. Being beaten is one thing. Being abused by the police is one thing. Torture is a very serious word. So if you were tortured you would have been very severely hurt. But since you just said there was no sign of torture that means you were beaten up by the police, correct.
I: I was beaten, they were beaten to my soft tissues, they were careful not to break my bones, when I gave in answer, and they did not like my answer, they would beat me.

So the Applicant says he was “beaten” by the police. In fact, he explained in some detail what they did to him, including falaka. It is the RPD who says he was not tortured and who makes a desperate and unavailing attempt to make the Applicant agree with its own mistaken view of what torture is. In any event, the Applicant testified that he was severely hurt. The RPD’s logic is that someone can only be tortured if the signs of the torture are visible; being severely hurt without marks on the body is not enough. There is no authority for this conclusion in law or common sense. It is also difficult to understand why the RPD thinks that being beaten up by the police cannot be torture: “Being abused by the police is one thing. Torture is a very serious word.” Torture is a serious word and, accordingly to all the evidence before the RPD, it happened to the Applicant. (paras. 52-53)

The Court noted that the Applicant’s signature at the end of the PIF does not include “declaration at the end of the document that the
information is complete, true and correct”, nor in signing it has a claimant sworn that the narrative if complete or that he has written the narrative himself (para. 55). The Applicant had, however, made such a oath about the fact that he had been tortured (para. 56). The RPD’s findings on credibility were unreasonable and therefore overturned (para. 58).

Furthermore on the RPD’s alternative findings that there was no documentary evidence to support the Applicant’s findings, the Court noted that there was corroborating evidence in that the documentary evidence described the same kind of mass arrests at Newroz as detailed by the Applicant.

Friday, September 30, 2011

Oliveros Rubiano—no need to exhaust state protection if reasonable efforts made

Oliveros Rubiano v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 106 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice O’Keefe

Date heard: September 22, 2010

Date decided: February 2, 2011

Counsel for Oliveros Rubiano: Jonathan E. Fedder

Counsel for Minister: Kareena Wilding & Veronica Cham

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

Decision Under Review: negative pre-removal risk assessment

The Applicant fled Colombia with his family, after having become the target of an extortion scheme by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and having reported it to the Colombian army (para. 4). He suffered detention, threats, the murder of family members, and in 2005 he himself was shot, which he reported (paras. 4-5). The family fled to Ecuador in September 2005, but upon finding out that there was no assistance with food, shelter, or legal counsel, the returned to Colombia (para. 6).

In April 2006, the Applicant and his family entered the United States as visitors (para. 7). They travelled to the Canadian border but the Applicant was denied eligibility to make a refugee claim in Canada because of the Safe Third Country Agreement. He applied for but was refused asylum in the US, and he subsequently crossed the border illegally and made a claim in Canada which was also refused (para. 7).

In November 20098 the Applicant filed a pre-removal risk assessment application and expressly requested an oral hearing (para. 8).

The officer found that the Applicant had not submitted sufficient evidence that he had been or was targeted, or that he had a similar situation to his cousins who had been murdered (paras. 9-10). The officer gave little weight to the affidavits of his mother and cousins, finding that they were interested parties and that their evidence was not supported by the objective evidence (para. 11). The officer found the Applicant had not demonstrated subjective fear, in that he had returned to Colombia from Ecuador (para. 12). Furthermore, the Applicant still had family in Colombia who had not been targeted, and failed to show a lack of state protection (paras. 13-14).

Citing Farias (Farias v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),2008 FC 1035, cited at para. 34), Katwaru (Katwaru v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2007 FC 612, cited at para. 35), and Gilvaja (Gilvaja v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 598 cited at para. 38) Justice O’Keefe found that the PRRA officer had “erred in law by requiring the applicant to show that he had exhausted all avenues of state protection”, since the Applicant had shown that he had made reasonable efforts to no avail (para. 39).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Dobson—ignored evidence of genuine marriage

Dobson v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 121 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Heneghan

Date heard: November 10, 2010

Date decided: February 2, 2011

Counsel for Dobson: David Matas

Counsel for Minister: Aliyah Rahaman

Place of Hearing: Winnipeg, MB

The Applicant applied for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Appeal Division upholding a visa officer’s decision refusing the permanent resident application of her sponsored spouse (para. 1).

The Applicant was a Canadian living in Edmonton. The spouse, Mr. Ali, was a 40-year-old citizen of Egypt. He had been married before; his first marriage was in Egypt and he had one child from it, his second marriage was in the United States in an apparent attempt to get status there, and his third was a common-law marriage with a woman with whom he had three children, and during which he fathered a fourth child with his first ex-wife (paras. 2-4).

The Applicant met her husband in September 2006 and their relationship began soon after.  She visited him in New York. He was not able to obtain a visa to visit her in Canada. They married in March 2007 and their application was refused in January 2008 on the basis that it was not a genuine marriage (paras. 5-7).

The Applicant and her husband maintained written and telephonic contact and she visited him seven times between March 2007 and August 2008. Their daughter was born in October 2008 in Edmonton; at which time Mr. Ali had moved back to Egypt (paras. 8-9). The IAD hearings took place in May, July, and August 2009, and in August 20098 the Applicant and daughter visited Mr. Ali and his family in Egypt (paras. 10-11).

The IAD considered the daughter and the evidence of ongoing contact, and nevertheless found that the marriage was not genuine (paras. 12-13). Justice Henghan found the IAD made factual findings that were “unreasonable, as they lack justification and intelligibility” (para. 16).

The IAD found the Applicant and her husband “had not addressed their religious incompatibility” (para. 17). She was a casually observant member of the United Church, and he was a non-practising Muslim (para. 18). They testified that there plan was to expose their daughter to both religions and allow her to choose; Heneghan found there was sufficient evidence that they has “addressed their religious differences”, such as they were, and that the IAD’s conclusion on this point was unreasonable (para.  19).

The IAD found that the Applicant had not discussed her husband’s fathering a child with his ex-wife; Henghan found to the contrary that the Applicant had testified that she had specifically discussed this with him (paras. 20-21).

The IAD found that “the Applicant and Mr. Ali had not discussed their future plans, and that the Applicant had not taken sufficient steps to integrate Mr. Ali into her life” (para. 22). Heneghan found that there was evidence of discussion of future plans and of integrating their finances, and that given the fact the Mr. Ali lived outside of Canada, “it is not clear how the Applicant would have further integrated Mr. Ali into her daily life” (paras. 23-24).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Tuesday, September 20, 2011

Davis—failure to assess hardship, ignoring psychological evidence

Davis v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 97 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Mactavish

Date heard: January 26, 2011

Date decided: January 27, 2011

Counsel for Davis: Michael Crane

Counsel for Minister: Laoura Christodoulides

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant was a failed refugee claimant from St. Vincent; the RPD did not take issue with the history she presented of “significant physical and sexual abuse as a young child” (paras. 1-4). Her H&C/PRRA, which included psychological reports, argued that she would suffer a deterioration of her mental health if removed and if separated from her father who lives in Canada.

A previous application had been denied, and that decision was overturned on judicial review in 2009 (paras. 5-7). That decision was overturned because the officer had relied on a WHO document not put to the Applicant.

In this second decision, the new officer “committed precisely the same error as the first Officer” (para. 9). The second officer relied on a different report, this one from the Pan American Health Organization, which was sufficiently detailed and technical that it ought to have been put to the Applicant (paras. 8-10). This was implicitly contrasted with human rights reports which are general and do not need to be put to the applicant.

Furthermore, the Applicant had put evidence before the PRRA officer which was both more recent and more direct, as it came from the St. Vincent government (paras. 10-14).

Furthermore, the officer ignored evidence of the Applicant’s emotional dependence on her father, drawing conclusions in direct opposition to the psychological evidence (paras. 15-17).

Finally, the officer erred in focusing on the availability of mental health care in St. Vincent, without assessing “whether requiring Ms. Davis to return to St. Vincent to access that care would amount to undue, undeserved or disproportionate hardship.” (paras. 18-19)

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Mings-Edwards—PRRA officer ignored one of two grounds of risk presented

Mings-Edwards v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 90(CanLII)

Mings-Edwards v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 91 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Mactavish

Date heard: Januray 25, 2011

Date decided: January 26, 2011

Counsel for Mings-Edwards: Aadil Mangalji

Counsel for Minister: Kareena Wilding

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant filed a pre-removal risk assessment on the basis of two grounds: fear of her abusive spouse, and her status as an HIV+ woman (para. 1).

The PRRA officer focused on the availability of state protection in Jamaica; Justice Mactavish found that this unreasonably ignored the second ground (para. 2).

The PRRA officer disregarded the single personal document attesting to the difficulty the Applicant would face as an HIV+ woman in Jamaica, stating that it was uncorroborated and speculative; he ignored the large volume of general country conditions evidence presented which corroborated her evidence (paras. 3-7). The officer wrongly disregarded this country conditions evidence as “generalized” (para. 7). The officer failed to address whether the discrimination described amounts to persecution or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment (para. 8).

Furthermore, the officer stated that there was state protection in Jamaica, but the entire analysis of state protection referred to the domestic violence ground and not the HIV status ground (para. 9).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Ortiz Torres–misconstrued evidence leading to faulty credibility analysis

Ortiz Torres v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 67

Judge: Justice Shore

Date heard: January 17, 2011

Date decided: January 26, 2011

Counsel for Ortiz Torres: Adela Crossley

Counsel for Minister: Kareena R. Wilding

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicants were a family from Mexico, who claimed on the basis that they were in fear of the Los Zetas gang, which had influence with every level of police in every region of Mexico (paras. 1-5).

Justice Shore pointed out a number of errors. The RPD wrongly relied on a translation of documents that said the principal Applicant was a “Police Service Technician” or a “non-commissioned officer” in finding that he was not credible when he testified that he was a police officer (paras. 6-8). The Board ignored relevant evidence and misconstrued the evidence before it (paras. 20-21). The Board refused to consider the fact that documents en route to the Applicant had been seized by Canadian customs, despite the Applicant proffering evidence (paras. 22-24). Because of its errors, the Board’s negative credibility assessment was flawed. It therefore also erred in its general analysis of risk and IFA (paras. 32-33).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED