Showing posts with label refugees. Show all posts
Showing posts with label refugees. Show all posts

Saturday, November 24, 2012

Moreno Sandoval—addressing a complaint of improper interpretation

Moreno Sandoval v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1273 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice O’Keefe; Date heard: October 15, 2012; Date decided: Octoer 31, 2012; Counsel for Moreno Sandoval: Richard Odeleye; Counsel for Minister: Suran Bhattacharyya; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario.

The Applicants were Mexican citizens who had refused on the basis of lack of nexus, lack of credibility, failure to rebut the presumption of state protection, and lack of individualized risk. They requested a declaration that they were Convention refugees or persons in need of protection, or in the alternative to have the decision overturned.

The Principal Applicant worked in dairy sales. He was approached by men who wanted to join his business, and his wife and children were attacked. They fled to another city where he was again attacked. He tried to complain, but the police said that since the original incident happened in Irapuato, he’d have to make the report there. He did so, but felt that the police there weren’t responsive. The Human Rights Commission could not help them. They therefore fled to Canada, arriving in June 2009 (paras. 1-8).

The RPD found that the Applicants feared criminals, and therefore had no nexus to the Convention. Furthermore:

The [RPD] highlighted the Federal Court’s holding that a person’s risk is not personalized where the risk of actual or threatened violence is faced generally by others and not specific to the claimant. The [RPD] relied on documentation showing that thousands of citizens of Mexico have been victims of violence at the hands of criminals and drug cartels in Mexico. (para. 11)

The RPD doubted the Principal Applicant’s credibility on the basis of “material omissions and inconsistencies”, and stated that the Applicants may have left Mexico because of the generally rising levels of danger (pars. 13-14). The RPD also took issue with the police complaints, which it found inconsistent (paras. 15-20). The RPD also found that there was adequate state protection in Mexico, and that the Applicant did not rebut this presumption by going to the police, because they did not tell the police who the perpetrators were, or give the police adequate chance to provide protection (paras. 20-21).

The RPD’s findings largely revolved around credibility, and that was based on their testimony. In the hearing, the Applicants had complained about the interpretation. This was not addressed in the hearing, per se; the Member directed counsel to seek a remedy in writing at the conclusion of the hearing. Counsel did so. However, there is no indication that the complaint was considered by the Registrar or the Member (paras. 36-40).

Justice O’Keefe found that credibility, and therefore interpretation, were sufficiently central to the decision that it was a breach of procedural fairness, and therefore the decision would need to be overturned.

Monday, November 19, 2012

Huang—good faith in sur place claims

Huang v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 205 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Zinn; Date heard: December 1, 2011; Date decided: February 10, 2012;Counsel for Huang: Lindsey K. Weppler; Counsel for Minister: Judy Michaely; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario.

The Applicants were a family consisting of a Chinese woman and her minor children. In February 2007, having become ill, the Applicant became involved in Christianity and began attending a house church. In August 2008, the Applicant went into hiding when she learned that the Public Security Bureau was coming for the congregation. Friends were arrested and the PSB came to her house. She engaged an agent to bring her and her children to Canada. She also claimed on the basis of fear of forcible sterilization, since she had two children.

Justice Zinn found that the RPD had erred in relying on a 2005 document that suggested sterilization was no longer used as punishment for violating family planning laws, when a more recent document (2010) discussed a sterilization campaign in the Applicant’s home region. As always, the RPD may rely on whatever evidence it chooses, but cannot disregard evidence which directly supports the claim without giving a valid reason for doing so (paras. 22-24).

The RPD also erred in finding that the Applicant did not have a sur place claim in Canada, as the RPD found she was practising Christianity in Canada to strengthen her refugee claim. Justice Zinn noted that there was no evidence that her current practise of Christianity was not genuine (paras. 25-32).

Saturday, September 22, 2012

Olvera-Personal risk

Olvera v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1048 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Shore; Date heard: August 29, 2012; Date decided: August 31, 2012; Counsel for Olvera: Nico G.J. Breed; Counsel for Minister: Rick Garvin; Place of Hearing: Calgary, Alberta.

The Applicants were citizens of Mexico who were menaced by the Los Zetas gang for extortion. He could not receive help from the police or the PGR. The state human rights commission agreed that the state had to protect him, but that they lacked the resources to do so. The Applicants therefore fled.

The RPD found that there was no nexus to the Convention because the fact that the principal Applicant owned a business did not put him in a particular social group, and that his complaints to the police and human rights commission did not mean that he was targeted for expressing a “political opinions”. Justice Shore upheld these findings.

However, Justice Shore overturned the decision on the basis of generalized risk. He noted that “The jurisprudence is less settled, however, on whether persons personally targeted by criminal gangs face a generalized risk” (para. 37).

Justice Shore relied on the decision of Justice Gleason in Portillo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 678:

[38] In the Portillo decision, above, Justice Gleason held that it was unreasonable to find that an applicant, who had been personally threatened by a criminal gang, faced a risk of general criminality simply because criminal gang violence was rampant in the applicant’s country of origin. “It is simply untenable,” she wrote, “for the two statements of the Board to coexist: if an individual is subject to a personal risk to his life or risks cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, then that risk is no longer general.” Such an approach, Justice Gleason held would strain section 97 of the IRPA to the point of irrelevance: “If the Board’s reasoning is correct, it is unlikely that there would ever be a situation in which this section would provide for crime-related risks” (at para 36).

[39] Justice Gleason proposed the following test for determining the nature of the risk faced by an applicant. Firstly, one must assess whether the claimant “faces an ongoing or future risk ... what the risk is, whether such risk is one of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment and the basis for the risk” (at para 40). Secondly, the risk faced by the claimant must be compared to “that faced by a significant group in the country to determine whether the risks are of the same nature and degree” (at para 41).

On the case before him, Justice Shore noted in particular: “It is irrational for the Board to accept the principal Applicant’s allegations that he was specifically targeted by the Los Zetas and, yet, conclude that his particular risk was faced generally by other Mexicans” (para. 41).

Tuesday, August 02, 2011

Cruz Pineda—gang violence as particularized risk

Cruz Pineda v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 81 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Kelen

Date heard: January 12, 2010

Date decided: January 24, 2011

Counsel for Cruz Pineda: Patrick J. Roche

Counsel for Minister: Jane Stewart

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant requested judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying the Applicant’s claim for refugee status on the basis of his fear of a gang in his native Honduras (para. 2).

The Applicant worked as a delivery and cash pick-up person for a large grocery chain in Tula, Honduras (para. 3). In January 2006, he and his assistant were attacked by proclaimed members of the Mara Salvatrucha (“MS-13”) gang; the Applicant was beaten and warned off from telling the police, although he did tell his employers (para. 5).

The Applicant quit his job and began working for another company. In June 2007, the Applicant was again attacked on the road by the same men from MS-13; after injuring the Applicant they told him they would spare his life only if he told them about the best trucks to rob (paras. 5-6). The Applicant agreed but instead quit his job and moved, eventually fleeing to Canada (paras. 7-9).

The RPD found that what the applicant feared had no nexus to the Convention as he was a victim of crime (paras. 12-16).

The RPD made comments that the Applicant had been targeted, namely “‘the claimant became personally subjected to the risk of the MS’” (para. 17). However, the RPD then found that the applicant faced generalized, as opposed to personalized risk (para. 19). The RPD also found that the Applicant had an Internal Flight alternative (IFA) (paras. 21-23).

The Court found that the RPD had erred in finding that the Applicant was subject to only a generalized risk, in part because of an expert opinion letter noting that people who are perceived as having crossed or slighted MS-13 were at particular risk (paras. 37-39).

In the same vein, the RPD’s finding of an IFA was unreasonable since the RPD itself recognized that MS-13 operated throughout Honduras, and the same expert evidence was clear that the Applicant would be especially targeted (paras. 40-44).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Wisdom—insufficient weight to psychiatric assessment

Judge: Justice Beaudry

Date heard: January 18, 2010

Date decided: January 21, 2011

Counsel for Wisdom: Debbie Mankovitz and Simon Gruda

Counsel for Minister: Sébastien Dasylva

Place of Hearing: Montréal, Quebec

This was a review of the refusal of the Applicant’s application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (para. 1). The Applicant asserted that he was a national of Sierra Leone, although that was not determined (para. 3).

The Applicant was approximately 17 years old when he came to Canada, having spent time in Nigeria, Gabon, the Netherlands, and Brazil. In the latter two countries, he made refugee claims which were refused (para. 4). His Canadian refugee claim was refused in August 2006, in part because the RPD found him excluded under Article 1F(a) and 1F(c) because of a tattoo which allegedly identified him as a member of a rebel group “responsible for serious crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone” (para. 5).

Six months after the refusal (in early 2007), the Applicant was hospitalized for psychiatric reasons for five months (para. 6).

In judging the H&C application, the officer found that the applicant had not made sufficient efforts to integrate, and gave weight to the RPD’s finding that the applicant’s identity was not establish (paras. 8-9). Reference letters and the reports of a social worker and psychiatrist were given little weight (paras. 10-11).

The Court found that the officer put too much weight on the question of whether the Applicant’s identity was objectively determined, and therefore put too little weight on the medical/psychiatric evidence (paras. 13-14).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Monday, August 01, 2011

Gomes Sousa—failure to assess gender issues in state protection

Gomes Sousa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 63 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Noël

Date heard: January 17, 2011

Date decided: January 20, 2011

Counsel for Gomes Sousa: Laura Setzer

Counsel for Minister: Helene Robertson

Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario

The applicant and her son (the minor applicant) were nationals of Brazil. They fled the abuse of the applicant’s former spouse, Marcus, who had substance abuse and other psychiatric issues. The applicant had complained to the police but was told there was little they could do (paras. 1-2). The applicant initially had some support from her parents-in-law, but they blocked the involvement of the police because the father-in-law was himself involved in criminal activity, and he subsequently threatened the applicant (para. 3).

The Court determined that main issue was sufficiently of state protection and the application of the Gender Guidelines (para. 5).

The Court relied on Dean v Canada(Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 772 for the proposition that while a subjective unwillingness to go to the authorities was not, itself, sufficient to rebut state protection, circumstances may be such that they do not. The judge noted that in this case: “proper consideration of the Gender Guidelines may have led to a finding that this reticence to engage the proper authorities was more than subjective” (para. 7). The Court notes that the RPD failed to consider the Gender Guidelines when analyzing the applicant’s failure to approach the police (para. 8).

The RPD found that the applicant’s narrative about the father-in-law was implausible; the judge noted that “implausibility findings must only be made in the clearest of cases” (citing Valtchev v Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 776) (paras. 9-10). The decision concluded:

Hence, the Board’s decision in regards to the sufficiency of state protection is flawed in two aspects. Firstly, it failed to adequately assess the Gender Guidelines in order to fully address the reasons for which state protection was not sought, and secondly, it made an unreasonable plausibility finding, thus depriving the Applicants of a full and proper assessment of the reasons for which state protection was not sought. As such, the decision falls outside the range of acceptable outcomes defensible in fact and in law. The proper remedy is to send the matter for redetermination before a newly constituted panel of the Board. (para. 11)

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Aguilar Zacarias—gang targeting as particularized risk

Aguilar Zacarias v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 62 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Noël

Date heard: January 17, 2011

Date decided: January 19, 2011

Counsel for Aguilar Zacarias: Laïla Demirdache

Counsel for Minister: Korinda McLaine

Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario

The applicant was a Guatemalan national who claimed persecution at the hands of the Maras Salvatruchas (MS) gang, and one member of that gang in particular (para. 3). The applicant was a vendor in a market where he and other vendors were being extorted; he and another vendor informed on the gang, leading to one member being arrested but later released (para. 5). Eventually, the other informer was shot in an incident where the applicant was present (para. 6).

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found the applicant’s story credible (para. 8) and further found that the applicant’s delay in making a claim while he had a valid temporary workers permit was reasonable on the precedent of Gyawali v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2003 FC 1099 (para. 9). However, the RPD found that the applicant did not have a nexus to a Convention ground (para. 10).

At the Federal Court, the Minister submitted that the risk faced by the applicant was generalized, as criminal and the MS are particularly rampant in Guatemala (para. 12). The applicant argued that he was specifically targeted because of his actions against the gang and his knowledge of the murder his co-informant (para. 13).

Justice Noël relied upon the case of Martinez Pineda v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 365, wherein the applicant was targeted by the same gang in El Salvador (paras. 16-17). He noted that:

As was the case in Martinez Pineda, the Board erred in its decision: it focused on the generalized threat suffered by the population of Guatemala while failing to consider the Applicant’s particular situation. Because the Applicant’s credibility was not in question, the Board had the duty to fully analyse and appreciate the personalized risk faced by the Applicant in order to render a complete analysis of the Applicant’s claim for asylum under section 97 of the IRPA. It appears that the Applicant was not targeted in the same manner as any other vendor in the market: reprisal was sought because he had collaborated with authorities, refused to comply with the gang’s requests and knew of the circumstance of Mr. Vicente’s death. (para. 17)

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Liang—claim supported by documentary evidence, unreliable evidence from agent of persecution

Liang v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 65 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Shore

Date heard: January 19, 2011

Date decided: January 19, 2011

Counsel for Kumar: Hart A. Kaminker

Counsel for Minister: Alex C. Kam

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The applicant was a Chinese national who made a refugee claim on the basis of her belonging to an underground church (para. 8).

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) had found that, on a balance of probabilities, the authorities were not looking for the applicant “because no warrant/summons had been left at her home.” (para. 11)

However, Justice Shore found that the documentary evidence supported the applicant’s claim that the authorities could be looking for her, notwithstanding the lack of a summons/warrant left at her home (paras. 12-14). The RPD’s conclusion was therefore unreasonable.

The RPD also found that “the evidence did not support that the Applicant has good grounds for fearing persecution in an unregistered house church” (para. 15). Justice Shore noted that, notwithstanding the lack of documentary evidence of house-church members being arrested in Fujian province, there was documentary evidence of other kinds of persecution and destruction of house-churches (paras. 16-17). In particular, Justice Shore was critical of the RPD’s reliance upon evidence produced by the Chinese government (i.e., the agent of persecution) (para. 20). Therefore, since the documentary evidence supported the claim, it was unreasonable for the RPD to deny it (para. 22).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Josile—women as a particular social group

Josile v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 39 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Martineau

Date heard: December 8, 2010

Date decided: January 17, 2011

Counsel for Josile: Russell L. Kaplan

Counsel for Minister: Helene Robertson

Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario

The applicant was a female Haitian national who had left Haiti in 2005 and had a refugee claim rejected in the United States, following which she came to Canada and in 2007 made a claim on the basis of political opinion, social group Haitian women, and social group family (para. 3). Her father was a minor local official who had been beaten and threatened for cooperating with the police, and she also feared the level of sexual assault and lack of state protection for women (para. 4).

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found that the applicant was not credible regarding her family’s situation (para. 5). Regarding the other grounds, the RPD found that she feared criminals, not politically-motivated harm, and therefore was not protected by the Convention (para. 6). Finally, the RPD found that Haitian women do not face persecution as a particular social group, as any persecution they faced was, again, criminal rather than political (para. 7). She challenged the RPD’s legal analysis of criminality versus political persecution.

Justice Martineau noted that:

The situation of sexual abuse and violence against women in Haiti has recently come to the attention of the Federal Court … In this regard, the Court has cautioned the Board not to import into the definition of a Convention refugee, legal requirements which are specific to section 97 when the Board is assessing whether the fear of persecution is based on a Convention ground in light of section 96 of the Act. (para. 11)

Having reviewed the case law, Justice Martineau noted:

Indeed, a gender-specific claim cannot be rejected simply because the group in question or its members face general oppression and the claimant’s fear of persecution is not supported by an individualized set of facts. Where the claimant has not, himself or herself, experienced the type of persecution, he or she fears, the claimant can use evidence of similarly-situated persons to demonstrate the risk and the unwillingness or inability of the state to protect … (para. 22)

Justice Martineau then turned to similar immigration cases (Dezameau v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 559 (CanLII)) as well as non-immigration jurisprudence (R. v. Osolin, 1993 CanLII 54 (S.C.C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595) as well as the Immigration and Refugee Board’s own Gender Guidelines, all as authority for the proposition that rape and sexual assault, by their very nature, target women as women (paras. 24-27). Therefore, according to those and other authorities, women fearing sexual assault are a particular social group (paras. 28-32). Therefore the RPD’s finding that nexus had not been established was unreasonable (para. 33).

Justice Martineau also criticized the RPD for making comments about the fact that boys can also be victims of rape (irrelevant, since in that circumstance they are a particular social group in themselves) (para. 34); and stated that “The Court is also appalled by certain gratuitous statements of the Board” about the crime of rape (para. 35).

Unusually, Justice Martineau went further than simply overturning the decision by directing the RPD to consider the new circumstances and risks arising out of events in Haiti since the initial claim was heard (paras. 38-39).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Kumar—failure to assess credibility

Kumar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 45 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Bédard

Date heard: January 11, 2011

Date decided: January 17, 2011

Counsel for Kumar: Michel Le Brun

Counsel for Minister: Isabelle Brochu

Place of Hearing: Montreal, Ontario

The applicant was an Indian national of the Hindu religion from the Punjab region who alleged persecution on the basis of his having been suspected of aiding two friends who were Sikh militants (para. 3).

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejected the claim on the basis that the applicant had an internal flight alternative (IFA) to Bombay. The RPD had not assessed the applicant’s credibility because, having found that there was an IFA, the RPD stated it was not necessary (para. 4).

Justice Bédard noted that the standard of review in assessing IFA was reasonableness (para. 6). She found that the RPD committed errors and that its decision out to be overturned (para. 10).

The RPD could not have assessed the issue of IFA without accepting certain parts of the applicant’s story as true. This is simply because the RPD cannot assess an IFA without regard to the circumstances, which it can only do with with reference to the claim (paras. 13-16). The RPD could not have accepted only the part of the claim which supported the finding of the IFA without some reason (para. 16).

However, that selective acceptance is exactly what the RPD did. It explicitly stated that it made its finding that there was an IFA “even if the claimant’s story had been true” (para. 17). However, it rejected other parts of the applicant’s story that militated against the finding of an IFA, i.e. his argument that the police would be looking for him throughout the country (paras. 18-21). The RPD could not accept certain parts of the claim and reject others without explicitly stating why it did so (para. 21).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Muhari—considering the totality of evidence and discrimination in refugee case

Muhari v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 27 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Scott

Date heard: December 15, 2010

Date decided: January 12, 2011

Counsel for Muhari: Michel Le Brun

Counsel for Minister: Emilie Tremblay

Place of Hearing: Montréal, Quebec

The principal Applicant and his family were of Hungarian ethnicity but Serbian citizenship. They arrived in Canada on visitors visas in January 2008. In February 2008, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, heightening the Applicants fears of persecution based on their ethnicity (paras. 2-5).

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found the Applicants credible but rejected their claim on the basis that they had suffered discrimination, not persecution (para. 7).

Justice Scott reiterated the settled law that the RPD must consider all the evidence on an issue and if rejecting evidence must provide an explanation (paras. 13-15).

In the Applicant’s case, the panel referred to a piece of documentary evidence which, on the whole, supported their case; however, the panel referred only to a part of the document which supported the panel’s conclusions (para. 16). Justice Scott stated that while it was true that the panel did not have to explicitly refer or respond to each piece of documentary evidence, but added “However, where the evidence deals with an element that is crucial to the dispute, the panel’s obligation is quite different. It must refer to that evidence and explain why it did not accept it (Singh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 485 (CanLII), 2009 FC 485, [2009] FCJ No. 616 (QL) at paragraph 15).”

Justice Scott also found that the panel had failed to consider the cumulative effect of severe discrimination, which may amount to persecution (paras. 23-25).

JUDICIAL REVIEW GRANTED

Thursday, May 12, 2011

Raina–equivalency of offenses

Raina v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 19 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Heneghan

Date heard: July 13, 2010

Date decided: January 11, 2011

Counsel for Raina: Krassina Kostadinov

Counsel for Minister: Amy Lambiris, Manuel Mendelzon

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant was a citizen of India who claimed refugee protection after coming to Canada in 2006 (para. 2).

Before coming to Canada, the Applicant had been convicted of “indecent assault” in New Zealand in December 2001, and served 2.5 years. At the same time, he was acquitted of the “more serious offence of sexual violence for the same incident” (para. 2).

Before the RPD, the Minister argued that indecent assault was the equivalent of the Canadian crime of “Sexual interference”, referring to s. 151 of the Criminal Code, which states that it could be dealt with summarily (term of 14 days to 18 months) or by indictment (term of 45 days to 10 years) (para. 4).

The RPD found the Applicant’s conviction to be equivalent to “child molestation” and stated without explanation that the punishment could be up to ten years, which the RPD found to create a presumption that the Applicant had committed a serious non-political crime. The RPD rejected the Applicant’s argument that the elements of the offense in New Zealand did not match those in s. 151 of the Criminal Code (paras. 5-6).

Justice Heneghan relied on the FCA decision of Hill v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1987), 73 N.R. 315 for its statement on determining equivalency:

“It seems to me that because of the presence of the words ‘would constitute an offence ... in Canada’, the equivalency can be determined in three ways: - first, by a comparison of the precise wording in each statute both through documents and, if available, through the evidence of an expert or experts in the foreign law and determining therefrom the essential ingredients of the respective offences. Two, by examining the evidence adduced before the adjudicator, both oral and documentary, to ascertain whether or not that evidence was sufficient to establish that the essential ingredients of the offence in Canada had been proven in the foreign proceedings, whether precisely described in the initiating documents or in the statutory provisions in the same words or not. Third, by a combination of one and two.”

On the basis of Hill, Justice Heneghan found that the RPD had failed to apply the proper tests for equivalency (paras. 7-9).

Furthermore, Heneghan J. found that the RPD had erred in using the Applicant’s acquittal on the charge of “sexual violence” to determine whether the conviction was for a serious non-political crime (para. 10). Relying on Bertold v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), 175 F.T.R. 195, Justice Heneghan reiterated that such “references to outstanding criminal charges are inadmissible and violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms…” (para. 11).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Friday, May 06, 2011

Kirichenko–failure to deal with relevant evidence on conscientious objection

Kirichenko v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 12 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Russell

Date heard: October 28, 2010

Date decided: January 6, 2011

Counsel for Kirichenko: Geraldine MacDonald

Counsel for Minister: Gordon Lee

The Applicant is a citizen of Russia by birth and Israel by marriage. He claimed refugee protection in Canada due to fear of returning to either country (para. 2).

The Applicant testified that he had been kidnapped by Chechen rebel in 1995 and received injuries then. In 1997 he testified against one of the kidnappers and consequently received death threats. In 1997, he had planned to testify that Russian authorities had been complicit in the kidnapping, and he believed that the authorities wanted to stop him from giving testimony. He and his wife fled to Israel, where they had a child (para. 3).

The Applicant and his wife returned to Russia in 2000 and divorced in 2001. In 2003, the Applicant was again called to testify against his kidnappers and received death threats. He testified that he appeared in court in 2005 and on the following day was attacked by three men. Later in 2005 he was the victim of an attempted hit-and-run. In 2006, he was called to testify again and again received threats, so he decided to leave Russia (para. 4).

In 2006, the Applicant travelled to Israel, where he discovered that because he had been absent for over three years, his bank accounts had been closed and his documents expired. Because he was no longer the father of a young child, he would have to serve in the Israeli military. He left Israel, spent two months in Germany without claiming asylum, and then came to Canada (para. 5).

The RPD found that the Applicant lacked credibility (para. 7), and that he had not established that he was a conscientious objector to serving in the Israeli military (paras. 6-16), in part because it found he had served in the Russian military (para. 10).

At the Federal Court, the Minister conceded that the RPD had erred in finding that the Applicant had served in the Russian military, but maintained that the rest of the analysis on Israel was sufficient to allow the decision to stand (para. 45). Justice Russell, however, found two errors (para. 46).

First, the RPD cited and relied upon a Response to Information Request (an internal research document) that had never been disclosed to the Applicant; this was not “a situation where it can be said that the RPD used a country condition document from public sources that was available to the Applicant” (paras. 47-48). 

Second, the RPD did not mention or deal with the documentary evidence that conscientious objector status was not available to males in Israel (para. 49).

These two errors rendered the decision reviewable since “the whole notion of there being a way out for the Applicant through some available option that he failed to apply for was, on this evidence, entirely illusory” (para. 51).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Thursday, May 05, 2011

Perez Mendoza–state protection analysis must be contextual

Perez Mendoza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 119 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Lemieux

Date heard: November 19, 2009

Date decided: February 4, 2010

Counsel for Perez Mendoza: Alyssa Manning

Counsel for Minister: Khatidja Moloo

The Applicant was a citizen of Mexico who had applied for refugee protection in Canada and had been denied. The issue was whether he had rebutted the presumption of state protection (para. 1)

The Applicant identified his persecutors as high-ranking employees of two companies, TINEP and PEMEX. The Applicant worked for TINEP. TINEP did work for PEMEX. There was an internal investigation into whether TINEP had been paid for work it did not do, and the applicant initially cooperated with the investigation but was later told his supervisor would be dealing with the issue (paras. 2-5). 

In June 2007, the Applicant was assaulted by two men who told him to “go easy” on the investigation (para. 5). When he returned to work he was told he had been fired for tarnishing TINEP’s reputation and the political career of another PEMEX engineer involved in the scandal (para. 6). The Applicant made a complaint for wrongful dismissal, which appears to have lead to him being assaulted and threatened in a second incident (para. 7).

The Applicant now believed that the two companies were involved in a corruption scheme to funnel money towards the Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP) and other political causes. He told a television station who covered the story. Soon he began receiving threatening phone calls, so he moved to another state. In August 2007 he was kidnapped and assaulted, and was told that it was because he had tarnished the reputation of TINEP’s owner and his son (paras. 8-10).

The Applicant made a denunciation to the police, and then again relocated. People continued to look for him. In October 2007 his car was shot at and he filed a second denunciation. He relocated again. He was advised by a lawyer to leave Mexico and he did so (paras. 11-13).

While the RPD did not doubt the Applicant’s story (para. 2), it found that he was targeted by criminals which did not provide a nexus, and furthermore that be relocating after making complaints he did not allow enough time to see if state protection would be forthcoming. Furthermore, the RPD appeared to have misapprehended the number of times the Applicant complained to authorities (paras. 14-20). As a result the RPD found that the Applicant did not “take all steps or even reasonable steps to seek protection in Mexico” (para. 23).

Justice Lemieux relied on Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689; Carillo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 94; Avila v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 359; and Hurtado-Martinez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 630 to creat a summary of the steps of analysis for this issue:

1) The state is presumed to be willing and capable of protecting its citizens (Ward).

2) Evidence of the state’s willingness to protect cannot be imputed as evidence of adequate state protection (Ward).

3) Each case is sui generis so while state protection may have been found to be available in Mexico, maybe even in a particular state, this does not preclude a court from finding the same state to offer inadequate protection on the basis of different facts (Avila).

4) The claimant is expected to have taken all reasonable steps in the circumstances to seek state protection from his persecutors (Ward, Avila). A claimant who does not do so and alleges that the state offers ineffective or inadequate protection bears an evidentiary and legal onus to convince the tribunal (Carillo).

5) This exception to the general expectation that claimants approach the state supports the principle that the claimant is not required to put himself in danger in order to demonstrate ineffectiveness (Ward, Avila).

6) Where a tribunal determines the applicant has failed to take steps to seek protection this finding is only fatal to the claim if the tribunal also finds that protection would have been reasonably forthcoming. A determination ofreasonably forthcoming requires that the tribunal examine the unique characteristics of power and influence of the alleged persecutor on the capability and willingness of the state to protect (Ward, Avila, Heurtado-Martinez).

7) Similarly, where a non-state actor is alleged to have persecuted the claimant, the tribunal must examine the motivation of the persecuting agent and his ability to go after the applicant locally or throughout the country, which may raise the question of the existence of internal refuge and its reasonableness (Avila).

8) The kind of evidence that may be adduced to show that the state protection would not have been reasonably forthcoming includes: testimony of similarly situated persons, individual experience with state protection and documentary evidence (Ward).

9) The standard of proof is balance of probabilities (Carillo).

10) The quality of such evidence will be raised in proportion with the degree of democracy of a state (Avila).

11) The degree of democracy may be lowered if the state tolerates corruption in its institutions (Avila).

12) Evidence of remedies for corruption is not evidence of their practical effect (Avila). In order to neutralize impact of corruption on the evidentiary analysis, the Board must determine that these remedies have a positive practical effect.

13) The evidence must be relevant, reliable, and convincing to satisfy the trier of fact on a balance of probabilities that the state protection was inadequate (Carillo). (para. 33)

Justice Lemieux applied the principles above and found that the RPD had made two errors. It had ignored the Applicant’s explanation of why he had to leave the jurisdictions following his filing of complaints, and it did not make an analysis of whether state protection would have been reasonable forthcoming in the Applicant’s circumstances (paras. 39-43).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Kaleja–failure to properly consider country conditions and discrimination versus persecution

Kaleja v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 252 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice O'Keefe

Date heard: October 14, 2009

Date decided: March 4, 2010

Counsel for Kaleja: Max Berger

Counsel for Minister: Kevin Doyle

The Applicants were a father and daughter from the Czech republic of Roma ethnicity who had claimed refugee protection in Canada, and their claims had been denied by the RPD (para. 1).

Both Applicants had a history of being discriminated against in the Czech Republic because of their ethnicity, and the father had been attacked by skinheads (paras. 3-8).

The crux of the Applicants’ case was that the Board had erred in its understanding of the fact that they were not represented by counsel, in its analysis of the cumulative discrimination amounting to persecution, and in its analysis of country conditions (paras. 9-11).

The RPD decision contains a single paragraph on the general conditions for Roma in the Czech Republic, and then finds that the past experiences of the Applicants did not meet that threshold. Justice O’Keefe found that “This does not respect the requirement of an ‘existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process’…” (paras. 21-22). For the Member to have properly found that the Applicants experienced only discrimination and not persecution, he or she would have had to “sufficiently distinguish persecution from what the applicants experienced” (para. 23) and properly address the country conditions documents (para. 24), since the Member did come to the conclusion that they were members of a persecuted group (para. 25).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Friday, December 17, 2010

Kadah—failure to consider relevant evidence

Kadah v. Canada (MCI), 2010 FC 1223

Issued: December 3, 2010

Presiding: Justice O’Keefe

For the Applicant: Michael F. Battista

For the Minister: Amy King

This case was a judicial review of a finding that the Applicant, a homosexual Arab Israeli, was not a refugee on the basis that there was sufficient state protection in Israel.

There was no question of the Applicant’s credibility, or that he had faced violent persecution. However, the Board found that Israeli law enforcement would have been willing and able to protect him, and the fact that he was rebuffed the only time he sought help was not a good enough reason for him to have not continued to seek help.

Justice O’Keefe recognized the presumption of state protection, particularly in democratic countries, but also notes that “…democracy alone does not ensure adequate state protection and the Board must consider the quality of the institutions providing that protection (see Katwaru v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2007 FC 612 at paragraph 21)” (para. 39).

While the Applicant’s single negative experience with he police was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of state protection, the Board had before it documentary evidence of similarly situated individuals who also were unable to access state protection. While the Board is presumed to have considered all evidence put before it, “where there is important material evidence that contradicts a factual finding of the Board, it must provide reasons why the contradictory evidence was not considered relevant or trustworthy” (para. 43). The Board stated that “‘there is no evidence to suggest that police are not responsive to or fail to investigate complaints by members of the Arab community’” (para. 45), when in fact there was “extensive documentary evidence before the Board regarding Israeli police violence and intolerance towards Arab Israelis and Palestinians” (para. 46). The Board also found that “‘there is no evidence of persecution in Israel based on sexual orientation and, in fact, there are specific laws prohibiting discrimination on such a basis’” (para. 47), which contradicted with the Board;s finding that the Applicant’s testimony of his experiences was credible, as well as documentary evidence of persecution (paras. 48-49).

JUDICIAL REVIEW GRANTED

Thursday, March 05, 2009

CSIS: Disregarding International Law Since (at least) 2003

So this is horrifying, although I suppose not really surprising:

globeandmail.com: CSIS asked Sudan to arrest Canadian, files reveal

Mr. Abdelrazik is a political refugee who became a Canadian citizen in 1995. In 2003 he was arrested by the Sudanese authorities on the advice of CSIS. In prison for 11 months, he was tortured, and was interrogated by CSIS agents as well as US intelligence operatives. Finally released—because even the Sudanese authorities, well known for their disregard of human rights, could not justify holding him. He was rearrested in October 2005, and held for a further 10 months. At least one of those arrests was at the request of the Canadian government.

Throughout, the Canadian government not only denied Mr. Abdelrazik his rights under international law, including consular protection, they actively obstructed his return to Canada by refusing to issue him emergency travel documents, even after promising to do so as soon as he had arranged a ticket to fly home. They have seized his assets and stated that anyone who gives him money to pay for the ticket is committing a crime and will be charged under terrorist legislation.

The RCMP investigated Mr. Abdelrazik and exonerated him in NOVEMBER 2007. He still can’t come home.

Think Maher Arar was a one-time mistake? Think again.

Saturday, May 10, 2008

*Bad* ICTR ... no cookie for you!

Opinio Juris serves up this piece of ridiculous-pie: "ICTR 'Disowns' Human Rights Watch".

Apparently, although HRW is an NGO on which "the UN Court has relied on for the last 14 years for expert testimony", "the prosecutor accused HRW of lack of credibility and having confused the collection of information on the violations of human rights in general and international criminal proceedings". To which I can only respond: come again?

This is ICTR's response to HRW's arguments against sending the remaining accused persons to stand trial in Kigali, which would allow ICTR to close up shop. Kevin Jon Heller, author of the OJ post, has written on the unlikelihood of fair trials for the accused under the Rwandan justice system (Heller, Kevin Jon, "What Happens to the Acquitted?" . Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, 2008 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005772) and HRW has documented the problem as well.

Now, call me crazy, but isn't this part of the justification for international ad hoc tribunals anyway? And wasn't everyone (justifiably) up in arms when the Iraqis tried Hussein in sketchy circumstances? On a human level, I can't really blame the Rwandan system for being willing to play a little fast an loose with the rights of the accused, given the horrific nature of the crimes. But the fact that we may empathize doesn't mean we agree.

Also, I am sooo tired of human rights NGO's being relied upon when it suits a courts purposes, and then discarded the second they disagree. I have seen this many times in the refugee system: Amnesty or HRW suggests a country is safe, back you go! But if they suggest otherwise, and a "neutral" source (99.9% of the time, US State Department reports) disagree or are less emphatic, then obviously the NGO, as a partisan organization (who goal is, apparently, to invent or exaggerate human rights abuses, as if that were necessary, to allow fake refugees to make claims) cannot be believed.

Keep an eye on this, folks.

Wednesday, January 09, 2008

Why don't Canadians understand Canadian Refugee Law?

The CBC reports that the Canadian Border Services Agency is trying to deport Laibar Singh, a paralysed Sikh man who has taken refuge in a Vancouver temple. (here and here)

Singh came to Canada in 2003 on a forged passport. He suffered a massive stroke three years later that left him quadriplegic and unable to care for himself.

...

Singh initially sought refugee status in 2003 on the grounds that he would be persecuted by police in Punjab, where officials have accused him of links to separatist militants, but his refugee claim was denied that same year.

Now, what bothers me is not the fact that Singh's health problems are not grounds for his refugee claim, since that's settled law and although it seems harsh, consider how quickly our whole system would collapse if we accepted refugees on the SOLE BASIS that they came from countries with poor(er) medical care.

Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 103 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85: restricting mechanisms reflect the fact that the international community did not intend to offer a haven for all suffering individuals. The need for “persecution” in order to warrant international protection, for example, results in the exclusion of such pleas as those of economic migrants, i.e., individuals in search of better living conditions, and those of victims of natural disasters, even when the home state is unable to provide assistance, although both of these cases might seem deserving of international sanctuary.

However, I'm perturbed by the numerous comments here, which often come down to a simplistic "he's illegal, deport him!" analysis (if it can be called that).

The Refugee Convention expressly forbids such tactics:
Article 31
Refugees unlawfully in the country of refugee
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.
If you're being persecuted by your government, how exactly are you going to obtain a passport? Or, if you need to escape that country to save your life, but you need a visa to enter a reasonable country of refuge, but that country won't issue you a visa if it thinks you're going to become a refugee, are you supposed to just sit there and die?

Wednesday, July 25, 2007

And you went for THAT as a headline?

As I was checking out my sweet, sweet Google Reader this morning, I noticed this headline from CBC:

Sikh group slams immigration name change policy

The first bit of the article read:

A Sikh-Canadian group is slamming the long-standing immigration policy that forces people with the surname Singh or Kaur to change their last names.

Jasbeer Singh, of the World Sikh Organization, said the policy is incredibly out of synch in this day and age.

My god, I thought, seriously? Like, Ellis Island stylz? Freakin' ridiculous.

Then I read the rest of the article and my blood pressure dropped quite a bit. The actual issue is that, given how common the names Singh and Kaur are, people with those names are asked to give a second surname to distinguish their file.

Karen Shadd-Evelyn, a spokeswoman with Citizenship and Immigration Canada, said the reason for the policy is that it helps officials with the paperwork and allows them to identify people's files quickly, efficiently and accurately.

"You can imagine you wouldn't want your file to be confused with someone else's," she said.

...

Shadd-Evelyn said that while the department recognizes the tradition of having the names Singh and Kaur, it's their understanding that it is already a common practice for people in the Sikh community to have a third name.

"Generally, when we ask for that, they are accustomed to that and are used to providing a third name," she said. "They have it. It's not something that they're just making up on the spot."

Okay, well, both sides are being a little stupid I think.

According to this wikipedia article, there isn't a huge panoply of traditional Sikh names. The CBC article seconds that:

Singh and Kaur are common names in the Sikh community. In a tradition that began more than 300 years ago, the name Singh is given to every baptized male and Kaur to every baptized female Sikh. There are millions of Singhs and Kaurs around the world.

As someone who works in a doctors' office, and has worked with refugee and immigration files, I can tell you that even in small scale, repetitive names are a disproportionate complication. Also, families where the children are all named after the mother and/or father, and so on. Although I couldn't find a reference for this, in my own experience the Roma tradition of wives taking on their husband's given names is a particular hassle (paperwork-wise--I'm not criticizing any of these practices per se, but I do know they create administrative difficulties). So I suppose I have some sympathy for the paper-pushers at CIC who have to deal with this. According to StatsCan, almost 300,000 Southern Asians came to Canada between 1991 and 2001, so that's about 30,000 per year (about the population of Orangeville), and I doubt it's gone down much. Wikipedia claims there are about 600,000 Sikhs in Canada. That's a lot fo Singhs and Kaurs to sort out.

That said? This is exactly the kind of problem agencies like CIC are supposed to be able to sort out. For one thing, immigrants and refugees are assigned file numbers. Also, the way they've presented the issue to immigrants and sponsors does not match what they told CBC. The article included a link to a sample of the type of letter Citizenship and Immigration Canada sends out. The letter requests:

ORIGINAL passport for yourself after getting your surname endorsed on it. ...Please note that your surname must be endorsed on your passport. The names Kaur and Singh do not qualify for the purpose of immigration to Canada. [emphasis added]

Worst. Phrasing. Ever. Come on now, people. That really does sound like "change your name or no Canada for you--P.S., we are racist."

Frankly, I can't believe this is only coming out now.