Showing posts with label domestic violence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label domestic violence. Show all posts

Saturday, July 21, 2012

Pinto Ponce—actual practices of state protection must be assessed

Pinto Ponce v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 181 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Russell; Date heard: January 17, 2012; Date decided:February 8, 2012; Counsel for Pinto Ponce: J. Byron M. Thomas & Raoul Boulakia; Counsel for Minister: David Duggins; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario.

The applicant is a citizen of Bolivia who suffered domestic violence at the hands of her common-law partner. In 2005, she made a complaint to the police after being attacked and kicked out of the house. The police officer laughed at her and told her to be a better wife. He also called her abusive partner, and spoke with her partner’s husband, a senior police officer.

The partner found out about the report, presumably through his uncle. In retaliation, he beat and raped the applicant. The applicant fled to live with her brother in another city, but her partner found there there and assaulted her in public, until bystanders intervened.

The applicant made another complaint at the original police station, and spoke to a different officer who was more receptive. The applicant then went into hiding at her uncle’s home in a third city, La Paz. She did not go out lest her partner find her. Her parents told her that the police were not investigating, and that her partner was still looking for her.

At her uncle’s advice, the applicant fled Bolivia to the United States, where she lived illegally until she found out about the Canadian refugee system in July 2009, finally coming to Canada in December 2009.

The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denied the applicant’s claim on the basis of state protection (para. 13).

Justice Russell found that the standard of review on the question of state protection as a whole was reasonableness (paras. 26-27), but that on the issue of the legal test, the standard was correctness (para. 28).

On reviewing the objective evidence of state protection in Bolivia for victims of domestic violence, the RPD had stated:

…I accept that Bolivia’s past history of offering protection to women as victims of domestic violence was lamentable combined with societal beliefs that accepted this violence as a way of life. Yet, as this claim is forward looking, I accept that Bolivia is demonstrating an awareness of its past problems and is making advances through legislation, application and continued dialogue within the government, its citizens and foreign countries on further efforts to improve its past weakness related to domestic violence. (cited at para. 72)

Justice Russell found that the RPD had failed to look past the government initiatives to see whether “there is adequate protection in practice” (para. 73). He stated that there was “certainly a significant amount of evidence before the RPD that Bolivia’s “lamentable” past history of protecting victims of domestic violence has not changed”.

Justice Russell relied on E.Y.M.V. v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC 1364, which itself relies on Jaroslav v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 634 and Beharry v.Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 111.

Wednesday, July 11, 2012

Owochei—credibility assessment with translation issues

Owochei v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 140 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Russell; Date heard: December 8, 2011; Date decided: February 2, 2012; Counsel for Owochei: Raoul Boulakia; Counsel for Minister: Rafeena Rashid; Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario.

The applicant was a citizen of Nigeria whose application for protection on grounds of domestic violence had been refused by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD). The RPD found that the determinative issue was credibility.

Justice Russell found that the RPD had not made a clear general credibility finding, leaving it unclear whether it believed part or none of the applicant’s claims (para. 53). Although the RPD mentioned “examples” of supposed inconsistencies, Justice Russell focused his analysis on one problematic analysis.

The RPD stated that there was an inconsistency between the applicant’s PIF, in which she mentioned being abused by her husband after having fled to live at her parents’ house, and her viva voce testimony in why she stated that he did not physically abuse her (although there may have been an incident of verbal abuse) (para. 55). Justice Russell points out that the RPD accepted that she had fled the marital home, and that there was no evidence of any other reason for her to flee, suggesting that she had been being abused: “…if the RPD accepted that she was running away, it is reasonable to expect that it would pay close attention to the Applicant’s explanation that she did not change her story from physical abuse to verbal abuse.” (para. 55)

Furthermore, Justice Russell points out that the RPD ignores the explanation given by the applicant, namely that there was a translation issue with her PIF (paras. 56-57). The applicant spoke Igbo, and there was an Igbo interpreter at the hearing, but the interpreter when she did her PIF spoke Yoruba. While the applicant spoke both languages, she was much more confortable in Igbo (para. 57). Therefore, the applicant stated that she had not “changed” her story, as the RPD alleged (para. 58). Justice Russell found the failure to consider this explanation was unreasonable (para. 58). He then went on to cite a number of cases that caution the RPD against overzealousness in seeking out problems with a claimant’s case; Attakora v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),[1989] FCJ No 444 (FCA), Owusu-Ansah v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] FCJ No 442 (FCA), Rajaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] FCJ No 1271 (FCA) (paras. 59-61).

Justice Russell found that the RPD’s reasons were too brief to give any other justification for the decision (para. 63). Therefore the decision was overturned.

Tuesday, September 20, 2011

Mings-Edwards—PRRA officer ignored one of two grounds of risk presented

Mings-Edwards v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 90(CanLII)

Mings-Edwards v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 91 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Mactavish

Date heard: Januray 25, 2011

Date decided: January 26, 2011

Counsel for Mings-Edwards: Aadil Mangalji

Counsel for Minister: Kareena Wilding

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

The Applicant filed a pre-removal risk assessment on the basis of two grounds: fear of her abusive spouse, and her status as an HIV+ woman (para. 1).

The PRRA officer focused on the availability of state protection in Jamaica; Justice Mactavish found that this unreasonably ignored the second ground (para. 2).

The PRRA officer disregarded the single personal document attesting to the difficulty the Applicant would face as an HIV+ woman in Jamaica, stating that it was uncorroborated and speculative; he ignored the large volume of general country conditions evidence presented which corroborated her evidence (paras. 3-7). The officer wrongly disregarded this country conditions evidence as “generalized” (para. 7). The officer failed to address whether the discrimination described amounts to persecution or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment (para. 8).

Furthermore, the officer stated that there was state protection in Jamaica, but the entire analysis of state protection referred to the domestic violence ground and not the HIV status ground (para. 9).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Monday, August 01, 2011

Gomes Sousa—failure to assess gender issues in state protection

Gomes Sousa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 63 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Noël

Date heard: January 17, 2011

Date decided: January 20, 2011

Counsel for Gomes Sousa: Laura Setzer

Counsel for Minister: Helene Robertson

Place of Hearing: Ottawa, Ontario

The applicant and her son (the minor applicant) were nationals of Brazil. They fled the abuse of the applicant’s former spouse, Marcus, who had substance abuse and other psychiatric issues. The applicant had complained to the police but was told there was little they could do (paras. 1-2). The applicant initially had some support from her parents-in-law, but they blocked the involvement of the police because the father-in-law was himself involved in criminal activity, and he subsequently threatened the applicant (para. 3).

The Court determined that main issue was sufficiently of state protection and the application of the Gender Guidelines (para. 5).

The Court relied on Dean v Canada(Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 772 for the proposition that while a subjective unwillingness to go to the authorities was not, itself, sufficient to rebut state protection, circumstances may be such that they do not. The judge noted that in this case: “proper consideration of the Gender Guidelines may have led to a finding that this reticence to engage the proper authorities was more than subjective” (para. 7). The Court notes that the RPD failed to consider the Gender Guidelines when analyzing the applicant’s failure to approach the police (para. 8).

The RPD found that the applicant’s narrative about the father-in-law was implausible; the judge noted that “implausibility findings must only be made in the clearest of cases” (citing Valtchev v Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 776) (paras. 9-10). The decision concluded:

Hence, the Board’s decision in regards to the sufficiency of state protection is flawed in two aspects. Firstly, it failed to adequately assess the Gender Guidelines in order to fully address the reasons for which state protection was not sought, and secondly, it made an unreasonable plausibility finding, thus depriving the Applicants of a full and proper assessment of the reasons for which state protection was not sought. As such, the decision falls outside the range of acceptable outcomes defensible in fact and in law. The proper remedy is to send the matter for redetermination before a newly constituted panel of the Board. (para. 11)

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Thursday, July 28, 2011

Borisovna Abbasova–applicability of Gender Guidelines and failure to consider psychological issues in credibility

Borisovna Abbasova v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 43 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice Shore

Date heard: January 10, 2011

Date decided: January 14, 2011

Counsel for Borisovna Abbasova: Denise Feret

Counsel for Minister: Christine Bernard

Place of Hearing: Montréal, Quebec

This was judicial review of a pre-removal risk assessment decision turning on the Gender Guidelines.

Justice Shore opened the reasons with the following emphatic but convoluted statement: “For decision-makers at all levels, procedural fairness sounds a rarely heard alarm, and that alarm must be heard if injustice is not to be done.” (para. 1)

The Applicant was a Russian national who alleged persecution at the hands of her common-law partner, in the form of domestic abuse complicated by the fact that the abuser was a police officer. She further alleged having been mislead by a fraudulent non-lawyer (para. 10).

Her refugee claim was denied in February 2009 (para. 12).

The Applicant filed a PRRA in August 2009, and it was denied in April 2010 (para. 13). A stay of removal was granted in June 2010 (para. 14).

The PRRA officer assigned no weight to the Applicant’s new evidence (para. 15).

The issues were whether the officer erred in not considering the relevant evidence and/or erred in failing to apply the Refugee Protection Division’s Guideline 7 of women fearing gender-related persecution (para. 16).

Justice Shore approved of the PRRA officer’s giving no weight to documentation which, while it post-dated the hearing, “simply echoed the information previously submitted” (paras. 28-30).

However, the PRRA officer also gave no weight to a post-hearing psychological assessment of the Applicant (para. 30). Justice Shore noted that the RPD had found the Applicant not credible, but the psychological report clarified this issue; the PRRA officer ought to have taken into consideration “Possible evidence of the applicant’s inability to testify” (paras. 30-31).

Justice Shore noted that:

It is not for the Court to reassess the evidence submitted to the PRRA officer and that is not what it intends to do; nonetheless, the developments in Ms. Abbasova’s evidence, particularly regarding her psychological condition, could have been considered to be relevant if they had been analyzed. More specifically, in her particular case, as shown, a psychological problem apparently impaired Ms. Abbasova’s ability to testify. That evidence could have been central to the determination of credibility, considering that the RPD and, subsequently, the PRRA officer found Ms. Abbasova not to be credible based on the answers she gave in her testimony. … (para. 37, emphasis in original)

Justice Shore also took into account the new evidence filed by the Applicant in the stay application, notwithstanding the fact that this new medical evidence was not before the PRRA officer (paras. 39-43). Furthermore, the Judge found that even if only the preliminary psychological evidence had been considered by the PRRA officer, the officer night have concluded in the Applicant’s favor or at least that there was an issue of credibility/psychological issues which warranted a hearing (para. 44).

Regarding the Gender Guideline, Justice Shore affirmed their applicability as an “aid” in PRRA decisions (paras. 53-54).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED