Showing posts with label inadmissibility. Show all posts
Showing posts with label inadmissibility. Show all posts

Friday, September 30, 2011

Perez Villegas—failure to conduct proper analysis of membership or terrorism

Perez Villegas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 105 (CanLII)

Judge: Justice O’Keefe

Date heard: September 21, 2010

Date decided: February 2, 2011

Counsel for Perez Villegas: Lorne Waldman

Counsel for Minister: Angela Marinos

Place of Hearing: Toronto, Ontario

Decision Under Review: refusal of permanent residence on the basis of inadmissibility (s. 34(1)(f))

The Applicant was a citizen of Mexico who in the mid-1990s had raised money and supplied for the indigenous people of Chiapas; he gave these material to Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) for distribution, since the Mexican Army has cut off access to the region (para. 4). The Applicant was threatened and sought asylum in Canada, which was granted in 1998 (para. 5). He stated on both the Personal Information Form for his refugee case, and on the application form for permanent residence (PR), that he was a member of EZLN (para. 6). His PR  application was approved in principle in December 1998, however, the ensuing background check took ten years and he was eventually called in for an interview in June 2009 (para. 7).

The officer found that EZLN was a group about whom there were reasonable grounds to believe that they had engaged in terrorist activities, and that while the Applicant was not a formal member he was a member, although the officer did acknowledge “that the applicant worked with the EZLN because it was the only network which could deliver supplies to the poor in Chiapas” (paras. 9-20).

Justice O’Keefe found that the officer had erred in that his reasons “did not explain how his findings amount to membership based on the jurisprudence or the CIC enforcement manual definition of membership”, but rather relied on the Applicant’s previous statements that he was a member (para. 48). The officer made factual findings about the Applicant’s relationship with EZLN but provided no analysis as to whether or how they contributed to a finding of membership (paras. 49-50). Noting that “any finding of inadmissibility ‘should be carried out with prudence, and established with the utmost clarity’”, Justice O’Keefe found that the officer’s finding was unreasonable (para. 51, citing Daud v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 701).

Similarly, on the issue of whether EZLN was a terrorist organization, Justice O’Keefe found that the officer had erred in simply stating the definition of terrorism from Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2002 SCC 1 and then asserting that EZLN’s activities fit that definition (para. 56).

There is a two-step analysis: “First, the decision-maker must show the evidentiary foundation to support a finding that an organization was engaged in acts of terrorism” (para. 54, citing Daud; Jalil v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2006 FC 246; Fuentes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),2003 FCT 379; and Alemu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 997)

In the second step, “…the decision maker must provide analysis of the acts the organization has committed and explain how they meet the definition of terrorism. This requires showing the link between the acts and the definition of terrorism provided” (para. 55, citing Naeem v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1735, and Fuentes).

Justice O’Keefe found that this analysis was not done:

Even if this Court reviews the officer’s assessment of the EZLN from the previous section, which was not part of his terrorism analysis, the officer does not indicate which evidence he is relying on to conclude that terrorist acts occurred. Moreover, there is no discussion at any point about how any acts of the EZLN were “. . . intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict . . .” …. In fact, the officer mentions civilians only twice in the assessment of the EZLN, both times to note that civilians were killed. He does not analyze how these civilians were killed, by whom, or whether the EZLN condoned or encouraged the killing. The officer mentions one report that said the EZLN had killed non-combatants but, again, the officer did not assess whether they were targeted or intentionally killed. As in Fuentes above, while the officer described some violent acts in the section entitled assessment of the EZLN, he does not show how these acts fit within the Suresh above, definition of terrorism (para. 57).

JUDICIAL REVIEW ALLOWED

Saturday, April 23, 2011

Pusat–procedural fairness and disclosure in inadmissibility

Pusat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 428

Judge: Justice Mosley

Date heard: January 24, 2011

Date decided: April 7, 2011

Counsel for Pusat: Lorne Waldman

Counsel for the Minister: John Loncar

The applicant was an Alevi Kurd who applied oversees as a member of the family class. His wife was a Canadian permanent resident who had been granted refugee status some years before and was attempting to sponsor her husband (paras. 1-4).

The applicant was interviewed at the Canadian embassy in Ankara in September 2007:

The interview focused on whether he qualified as a member of the family class, but did briefly discuss his admissibility. The applicant explained that though he supports some of the PKK’s goals, he does not support the PKK because he did not believe in violence. (para. 4)

The application was dismissed on the basis that the applicant was inadmissible as a member of the PKK. The applicant brought a judicial review (IMM-5482-09), which was settled when the Minister agreed to re-determine the application (para. 5).

Another interview was scheduled at the Ankara embassy for April 2010. The applicant’s counsel in Canada repeatedly requested disclosure from the Minister, to no avail; however, the CAIPS notes contained a notation that the applicant was advised a day before the interview and told that the interview was related to inadmissibility (para. 6).

At the second interview, the applicant admitted to being involved with PKK advocacy activities in Switzerland (and that he had lived there), but stated that any involvement with the PKK was due to social pressure. He reiterated his abhorrence of violence and his non-membership, and that he had not been involved with the PKK in Turkey. The applicant’s counsel was not allowed to make submissions following the interview, and the decision was made the next day (paras. 7-8).

The Certified Tribunal Record (CTR) contained redacted information, and the Respondent filed a motion under s. 87 to maintain the confidentiality of that information. On the basis that neither the Court nor the Respondent would seek to rely on the redacted information, the redactions were not challenged (para. 9).

The FC decision was made on the basis of the breach of procedural fairness, and none of the other grounds alleged (para. 12).

The breaches of procedural fairness cited by the applicant were the failure to disclose the basis of the allegation of membership prior to the interview, and the failure to give an opportunity to respond with submissions after the interview (paras. 15-16). The judge rejected the Minister’s submission that the phone call prior to the interview, in combination with the knowledge arising from the previous case, comprised sufficient disclosure:

The record is clear that the respondent did not reply to the communications from counsel and did not provide any meaningful disclosure before the interview, notwithstanding that the application was sent back on consent to be reconsidered for that reason. The respondent' s attempt to rely on the CAIPS notes as evidence that he was informed of the purpose of the interview by a telephone call from someone, presumably an administrative assistant at the Embassy, two days prior to the event, is misplaced. There is no affidavit evidence from the assistant to verify the facts stated in the CAIPS notes. (para. 19)

While acknowledging that the content of procedural fairness must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, Justice Mosley found that there were documents that had clearly influenced the decision, contained in the CTR, which ought to have been disclosed to the applicant prior to the interview.

Citing Mekonen v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1133 (which cites Haghighi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 4 F.C. 407 (C.A.), and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Bhagwandass, 2001 FCA 49), Justice Mosley found that this was a case where procedural fairness required the evidence to be disclosed and the applicant given a meaningful opportunity to respond to it (paras. 21-32).

Justice Mosley also rejected the Minister’s submission that, having found a breach of procedural fairness, the court ought not to grant a remedy on the doctrine of “no useful purpose” as expressed in Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v. Canada Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, [1994] 1 SCR 202 (para. 33). He found that the question was still live and that the inadmissibility decision was not inevitable (para. 34).

Tuesday, July 27, 2010

Afanasyev - inadmissibility for espionage, no need for formal relief submissions

Afanasyev v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 737

Decision by de Montigny granting judicial review of inadmissibility under s. 34 (and refusal to grant Ministerial relief under s. 34(2)).

The Applicant served in the Soviet military from 1985 to 1987, and reported on radio transmissions; he was declared inadmissible under 34(a) and (f), namely:

engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada;

…or being a member of an organisation that did so.

Justice de Montigny found that the officer’s findings on what, exactly, the Applicant did were problematic on multiple fronts. First, the officer cited both the CSIS explanation of what the Applicant allegedly did and the Applicant’s description, without dealing with discrepancies between the two accounts. Furthermore, the decision was predicated on the officer’s understanding of “espionage”, but nowhere is that understanding explained. (paras. 32-34)

Justice de Montigny also found that the officer failed to consider Ministerial relief under s. 34(2) on the sole ground that there were not formal, separate submission on relief; there had clearly been a request for relief to be considered, and there was relevant evidence on the record (paras. 38-42)